Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1976

Oil Pollution on Lake Superior: The Uses of State Regulation
A. Dan Tarlock
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tarlock, A. Dan, "Oil Pollution on Lake Superior: The Uses of State Regulation" (1976). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 2379.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2379

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Oil Pollution on Lake Superior: The
Uses of State Regulation
A. Dan Tarlock*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
II. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE OIL
POLLUTION
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION
A.

B.

C.

IV.

FEDERAL

64
66
70

70

POLLUTION STATUTES

1. ProhibitedDischarges
2. Federal Role in Cleanup and Damage Recovery
3. Liability Limitations
a. Liability Limitations for Clean-up Costs __
b. Liability Limitations for Personal Injury
and Property Damage
4. Monetary Penalties

72
74
75
75

REGULATION OF SHIP DESIGN AND OPERATION

80

-

-

77
78

1. Statutes and Administrative Regulations
2. Admiralty Rules of Navigation

80
82

COOPERATION WITH CANADA

83

STATE REGULATION OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION

85

A.

THEORETICAL BASIS FOR STATE SPILL LIABILITY LEGISLATION

B.

RECOVERY PURSUANT TO GENERAL WATER POLLUTION

C.

LEGISLATION
SPECIFIC REGULATIONS RELATING TO VESSEL POLLU-

D.

86
88

TION

90

STATE SPILL PREVENTION AN RECOVERY LEGISLATION

91

1. Strict Liability
2. Common Law Remedies

92
95

a. Property Damage
b. Economic Losses

96
97

c. Recovery by the States for Injuries to Fish
and Wildlife

98

3. Constitutional Limitations of State Legislation 100
a. Florida: Askew v. American Waterways
b.

E.
F.

V.

Operators
Maine: Portland Pipeline Corps. v. Environmental Improvement Commission

4. Express Federal Preemption
STATE POWER TODENY PORT ACCESS TO VESSELS
USE OF STATE LAND USE LAWS TO PREVENT SPILLS
By CONTROLLING PORT LOCATION

CONCLUSION

101
106

110
III
118
123

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:63

I. INTRODUCTION
Lake Superior is the purest of the Great Lakes,1 and its ecosystem the most fragile. The lake remains very cold most of the
year, and, because little water enters through tributary streams,
flushes slowly. As Lake Superior contains little organic matter
to serve as a substrata for bacterial growth, organic contaminants
introduced into the lake decompose very slowly. At present, Lake
Superior is a delicately balanced oligotrophic ecosystem which is
vulnerable to disruption by introduction of significant amounts
of foreign substances. 2
The lake is not only a natural resource of great beauty but
a major transportation artery as well. Commodity transportation
on the lake provides, at potential cost to future generations of
lake users, substantial economic benefits to the Upper Midwest
and Canada. Since the three major bulk commodities shipped
across the lake-iron ore and concentrates, coal, and grain 3 -are
environmentally benign, the current costs of commodity transportation do not generally include foregone opportunities for such
uses as fishing and shoreline recreation. Because ore is relatively
inert "a spill of this material will have relatively little effect on
the lake, even in the local area of the spill."4 Grain, which
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. A.B. 1962,
LL.B. 1965 Stanford University. This article is a revision of a paper commissioned by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for a conference
entitled, Lake Superior-A Resource Imperiled, sponsored by the state of
Minnesota in cooperation with the states of Michigan and Wisconsin and
the Province of Ontario held in Duluth, Minnesota in March of 1976. The
opinions expressed in this article are solely the author's and do not in
any way reflect the policy of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
1. J. NAPOLI, THE COASTS OF WIscoNsIN 6 (1975).
2. This description of the ecosystem of Lake Superior is taken from
Mount, Vick & Christensen, Potential Damage from Toxic Substances in
Lake Superior (unpublished paper prepared for the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency Conference, Lake Superior-A Resource Imperiled,
March 1976, Duluth, Minnesota, on file at MNmNESOTA LAW REVIEW). The
risk of damage to the ecosystem of Lake Superior is aggravated because
a spill of contaminants is more likely to occur near shore, the most biologically productive area.
3. In 1973, iron ore and concentrates, coal, and petroleum products
accounted for 66.4 percent of all commodities shipped across the Lake,
and the total tonnage of these commodities was 77.7 million tons. Oil
comprised by far the smallest percentage of these three commodities,
representing 0.6 percent of the United States total and 3.2 percent of the
Canadian total of commodities shipped. The remaining tonnage, 39.4
million tons, consisted primarily of grain. Sievwright, Strategic Superior, 3-4 (unpublished paper prepared for Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency Conference, supra note 2, on file at MONNESOTA LAW REVIEW).
4. Mount, Vick &Christensen, supranote 2, at 26.
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decomposes rapidly through bacterial action, also would have only
a minor local effect.
The ecology of the lake may, however, be significantly
threatened by another pollutant-oil. Although only small
amounts of oil are now shipped across the lake, and projections to
the year 1985 indicate that the current mix of commodities will
remain constant,5 an absolute increase in the volume of oil
shipped will subject the fragile ecology of Lake Superior to a
correspondingly increased risk of damage from oil discharges. 6
Oil may be discharged into waterways and on land both
intentionally and accidentally. A tanker discharges oil intentionally when it unloads a cargo, fills the cargo tanks with water
to provide ballast for the return voyage, and discharges the oily
ballast before taking on a new cargo. Because at present only
five oil tankers ply Lake Superior, however, oil which comes
from ship machinery and accumulates in the bilges of all vessels is a more likely source of intentional discharge. Accidental discharges occur when a ship goes aground or when a
marine disaster, such as hull damage from the pressure of the sea,
occurs.1

Improperly constructed and maintained storage facil-

ities and pipelines or human error during the ship-to-shore
transfer of oil are causes of other, less spectacular, accidental
discharges.
5. "Petroleum products, the smallest single category itemized here,
could double to 4 million tons, but this would still be'only 2% of the
total volume shipped." Sievwright, supra note 3, at 14.
6. In general terms, "oil has a low toxicity to marine life....
[but] [h]ydrocarbons may harm the viability of marine life without being directly poisonous. The breakdown of oil in the water by bacteria
can deplete the dissolved oxygen supply on which marine life depends.
Hydrocarbons can enter marine food webs and build up within them just
as pesticides do." Report of the Secretary General, Preventionand Control of Marine Pollution,U.N. Doc. E/5003, at 29 (1971). To date, documented evidence of the long term effects of massive crude oil spills is
lacking. According to a 1975 National Academy of Sciences Report, research indicates that
[t]he most damaging, indisputable adverse effects of petroleum
are the oiling and tarring of beaches, the endangering of seabird
species, and the modification of benthic communities along polluted coastlines where petroleum is heavily incorporated in the
sediments.... Studies to date indicate that areas polluted with
petroleum hydrocarbons "recover" within weeks or years; ...
however, composition of the local biologic communities may be
altered.
NATIONAL AcAnEmy OF ScnNcEs, Psnormnm iN

=

MARINE ENvmno-

106-07 (1975).
7. See Hearings on S. 333 Before the National Ocean Policy Study
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), for case
WENT

studies of major spills to 1975.

See N. MosTE=T, SuPEasm

74-78, 189
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The proposed construction of a tank farm at Superior,
Wisconsin, to store oil transported from Alberta by pipeline,8
highlights the need for the states bordering Lake Superior to survey the field of possible regulatory strategies and determine the
course they will pursue in order to handle the increased risk of
contaminating discharges. Decisions about a state spill strategy
for Lake Superior, as well as the other Great Lakes, must take
into account complicated legal and economic factors. Since much
oil imported into the United States is carried on ships registered
in foreign countries, many of them LVCC's (supertankers), prevention of spills involves regulation of international shipping, a
field in which spectacular accidents, such as the Torrey Canyon
spill, 9 recently have spurred international and national efforts
to prevent spills and compensate injured parties. Because prevention of tanker discharges depends on the cooperation of other
nations, the United States in most instances works through international standard-setting bodies to promote uniform transportation practices and ship designs and does not exercise its full power
under international law unilaterally to regulate tankers entering
territorial waters. 10 Moreover, imposition of stricter standards
by the United States alone would impair the competitive position
(1974), for a discussion of the commercial pressures that resulted in the
construction and use of supertankers before the effects of ocean pressures
on their hulls were sufficiently known.
8. The proposed storage facility and shipping terminal is to be
built by Lakehead Pipe Line Co., a subsidiary of Inter-provincial Pipe
Line Co., of Edmonton, Alberta, the operator of the largest crude oil pipeline system in the western hemisphere. The facilities would increase the
tonnage of petroleum products handled at the Duluth-Superior harbor
by 270 percent. It is estimated that in the first year of operation of the
Lakehead facility, Duluth-Superior would move from ninth to third
among Great Lakes ports, behind only Chicago and Indiana Harbor, in
the shipment of petroleum products. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
Office Memorandum (May 14, 1976) (on file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw).
9. In March, 1967 the tanker Torrey Canyon, with 119,328 tons of
crude oil aboard, ran aground off the southwest coast of England. During the week before the stranded vessel was bombed and sunk, approximately 60,000 tons of crude oil were released into the sea, causing a reported $18,000,000 in damage to the British coastline. McGurren, The

Externalities of a Torrey Canyon Situation: An Impetus for Change in
Legislation, 11 NAT. REs. J. 349 (1971).
10. Absent treaty restrictions,, the United States can impose unilateral design and operating standards on ships entering our territorial
waters and close our ports to non-conforming ships. M. McDOUGAL &
W. BURKE, THE PUBLIc ORDER OF THE OCEANS 99-100 (1962). Less established is the power to exclude vessels that are merely passing through
our waters. A coastal state's interest in environmental protection might
yield to the customary "right of innocent passage." Under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 28, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, ships of all states are given "the

1976]

OIL POLLUTION

of the merchant marine fleet." Thus, United States statutes
and regulations which deal with problems in oil pollution control
are designed to conform as closely as possible to international
rules.
In order to set the stage for an analysis of and some conclusions about the role of state law within this mesh of national
and international authority, the first sections of this Article
describe the most important international agreements and federal
laws which deal with the problem of oil pollution, noting, where
relevant, their particular effect on Great Lakes traffic.
The final section of this Article analyzes the various strategies the littoral states may pursue in developing programs to deal
with marine oil pollution. This includes a discussion of the
theoretical basis of a state's power to protect its natural resources;
the utility of general water pollution legislation in dealing with
oil contamination, the feasibility of enacting state spill prevention and recovery legislation, and the constitutional limitations
that may affect such legislation; the alternative possibility of controlling oil pollution by prohibitions on access to state ports or
waters; and the role of land use controls in pollution prevention
schemes. Although the focus of this discussion is on Lake
Superior, most of the strategies discussed could, of course, be used
by any of the Great Lakes states, and several issues, such as the
constitutional limits of state power in preventing oil pollution of
navigable waters, are relevant to the coastal states as well.
I.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
MARINE POLLUTION
International marine pollution efforts, which are designed
to protect both coastal nations and the high seas, are both direct
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." An innocent passage is defined as one not preiudicial to "the peace, good order or security of the coastal state." The Convention thus balances the traditional
claim of freedom of navigation with the interests of coastal states in protecting their coastal resources. See M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE. supra,
at 174-304. for a discussion of the factors relevant to determining the extent of a coastal state's power to control vessels rassing through its territorial waters. For an argument that passage by foreign vessels which
threatens environmental harm is not innocent, see R. Bilder. The Role
of Unilateral State Action in Preventing Environmental Injury 12-13
(unpublished paper. Universitv of Wisconsin, Grant College Program,
1973).

See also Kiselev, The Freedom of Navigation and the Problem

of Pollution of the Marine Environment, 6 GA. J. INT'L & Coivn'. L. 93
(1976).
11. See National Petroleum Council, Protectionof the Marine Environment, 8 NAT. REs. LAW. 511 (1975).
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and indirect.12 Public international agreements, for example,
directly set standards for the design and operation of vessels. By
establishing compensation schemes for damage victims, they also
indirectly provide tanker operators with an incentive to take
spill prevention measures.
The major international standard-setting body is the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), an arm of
the United Nations. National delegations are composed of both
public officials and private citizens representing various interests.' 3 Since 1954, IMCO has adopted a series of progressively
stricter conventions for the prevention of marine pollution. The
1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships 14 is the strongest of the international conventions
adopted to date. This complex document, not yet ratified by the
United States, represents the first international effort to regulate
pollution caused by noxious substances in addition to oil and to
12. See AimmcAN SOCIETY OF INTL LAw: WORKING GRoUP ON THE
ENvroRLVmNT, WHO PROTECTS THE OcmEw? (J. Hargrove ed. 1975).
13. See generally Silverstein, Technological Politics and Maritime
Affairs-Comparative Participationin the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization,7 J. MWATiE L. & Com. 367 (1976).
14. Done Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 12 IwL LEGAL MATERIALS 1319
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Convention]. After the Torrey Canyon disaster, tanker owners entered into a voluntary agreement assuming liability for up to $100 per gross registered ton or $10,000,000 per vessel per
incident, whichever is less. TOVALOP (Tanker Owner's Voluntary
Agreement Concerning Liability For Oil Pollution), reprinted in 8 INT'L
LEGAL MViAALs 497 (1969), provides only for payments to national governments for negligent spills. In 1971, a supplemental agreement was
signed. CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement To
Tanker Liability For Oil Pollution), reprintedin 2 J. MlAxrTM L. & Com.
705 (1971), requires TOVALOP-participating oil cargo owners, as opposed to tanker owners, to assume pro rata shares of oil pollution damage to governments and private parties for injuries to land and structural
improvements up to $30,000,000 per incident. The two agreements are
analyzed and compared to the two IMCO conventions in Becker, A Short
Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 5 J. MARiTM= L.
& Com. 609 (1974). The IMCO Convention modified TOVALOP by increasing the liability limits and substituting strict liability for negligence.
Another Convention proposed the establishment of an international fund
to indemnify tanker owners subject to liability and to compensate governments and private parties for damages for which a tanker owner
would not be liable or which exceeded the limits of the owner's liability.
Since this Convention has not yet come into force, however, CRISTAL
remains in effect, but not for ecological impairment generally. See also
Skocypec, The 1973 IMCO Convention: Tightening The Controls on Operational Oil Pollution from Tankers, 5 UCLA-ALAsKA
iL. Rsv. 353, 36970 (1976).
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establish vessel design and safety standards.1 5
In brief, the important provisions of the Convention are: (1)

both new and existing tankers are subject to the Convention; (2)
the Convention may be enforced both by flag states and the state
which suffers a violation within its jurisdiction;' (3) vessels
subject to the Convention must have an oil monitoring and control system; 1'7 (4) both private and public parties may present
claims to the Convention and bring suit in the civil courts of a
nation in which pollution damage was sustained; and (5) the Convention adopts important tanker design and operating procedure
8
modifications.'
15. Prior conventions are traced briefly in Note, No Dumping in
This Ocean: Nearing the End of Ship-Generated Pollution, 7 N.Y.U.J.
IN L. L. & PoL. 545 (1974).
16. 1973 Convention, supra note 14, art. IV, at 1322. For a brief
discussion of the power of coastal states to take preventive measures on
the high seas to eliminate a danger of oil pollution to their shores, see
Lettow, Marine Pollution, in FEDEAL ENVIoNmErTAL LAw 596, 616 (E.
Doglin & T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
17. The monitoring system is not required for the discharge of
"light refined products" (non-persistent oils) if IMCO discovers
that such equipment is not available. The implication of this
requirement is that such equipment is indeed available for monitoring crude oil and dirty products. However, recent studies of
the availability of oil-content meters make this conclusion questionable. Ifthe 1973 Convention requires equipment which will
simply prevent gross oil pollution, the technology is undoubtedly available. If, however, as seems to be the case, the requirement is for a reasonably accurate device, capable of differentiating between perhaps 55 liters/mile and 65 liters/mile, the assumption of the availability of such a device is highly questionable. Nevertheless the presence of any control system which
will at least prevent grossly polluting discharges is a welcome
improvement over current practices which usually rely on little
more than visual observation by the ship's personnel.
Skocypec, supra note 14, at 368 (footnotes omitted).
18. Old tankers of 150 tons gross tonnage or more are required to
operate by load-on-top procedures and to install facilities for cleaning
their cargo tanks and transferring dirty ballast residue and tank washings from cargo tanks into an approved slop tank or combination of slop
tanks. 1973 Convention, supra note 14, Regulation 15, at 1353. All new
LVCC's of 70,000 deadweight tonnage (dwt) must have a segregated ballast system. Id. Regulation 13, at 1351. As these design changes will
not prevent spills caused when a tanker goes aground, a separate chapter
attempts to minimize Torrey Canyon-type disasters by limiting the size
and controlling the arrangement of cargo tanks. Id. Regulation 24, at
1365. The theory is that such modifications will in the case of an accident limit the discharge of oil to prescribed volume limits which are
based on assumptions about side and bottom damage and hypothetical
outflow. Id. Regulation 22, at 1362.
Not all discharges of oil, however, are prohibited by the convention.
New tankers can discharge oily residues up to 1/30,000 of the total quantity of a particular cargo and old tankers can discharge up to 1/15,000.
Id. Regulation 9, at 1343-44. These exceptions allow substantial quanti-
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Unlike earlier treaties that exempted part of the Great Lakes
from coverage, the Convention, because it applies to "all ships"
carrying oil and designated hazardous substances, covers all such
traffic on the lakes. As a practical matter, however, the Convention's primary aim is to prevent catastrophic spills from large
ocean-going tankers, and many of the most significant design
innovations would, by their terms, be inapplicable to the smallerscale Great Lakes traffic. 19 The proposed Lakehead terminal
will, however, conform to the Convention requirement that signatory parties provide reception facilities for oily residues from
tankers and other vessels, capable of meeting without unnecessary delay the needs of ships using the terminal. 20 The terminal
will have ballast water storage tanks which hold 10,000 and
21
30,000 barrels of water-adequate for any tanker loading there.
Two earlier IMCO Conventions address the question of liability for spills and compensation for victims. The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,22 which
is now in force, makes shipowners strictly liable for discharges
prohibited by the Convention.2 3 The Civil Liability Convention
also provides for limited liability,24 creating a very real possibility that a government may be unable to recover all the costs of
cleaning up a spill. A second Convention, the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Cointies of oil to be discharged when a supertanker is involved. Since the
Convention prohibits oil discharge within 50 nautical miles of land, id.,
the exemption will not affect any state or province bordering the Great
Lakes.
19. 1973 Convention, supra note 14, Regulation 2, at 1339. See Note,
supra note 15, at 550-51. The largest vessels on Lake Superior weigh
only 12,000 dwt. Thus the requirements imposed by IIhfCO on supertank-

ers, for example, see note 17 supra, would obviously be inapplicable to

Great Lakes traffic. See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra.
20. 1973 Convention, supra note 14, Regulation 12, at 1350.
21. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, Refined Products Terminal Lakehead Pipeline Co., Inc.,
Superior, Douglas County, Wisconsin 63-65 (May, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Draft Environmental Impact Statement].
22. Done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Convention-Civil Liability].
23. A shipowner is not subject to liability if the injury is a result
of an act of war, an act of God, an act or omission wholly caused by
a third party with intent to cause damage, or a negligent act of government in the maintenance of navigational aids. Id. art. III, par. 2.
24. The limitations are described in Makovsky, Liability for Marine
Environment Pollution Damage in Contemporary International Sea Law,
6 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 59, 60 (1976).
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pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 25 has been drafted to
remedy this problem. It establishes an international fund, fed
by a tax imposed by each signatory nation 26 on oil imported by
sea, which will pay the damage claims of governments and
private parties for damages beyond the Civil Liability Convention
limitations. It will also partially indemnify tanker owners for
the damages for which they would be liable under that Convention.2 7 The Fund would allow claims for pollution damages up
to $36,000,000 and cover acts of God and situations where the
2
polluting vessel cannot be identified. s
The effect on state power of any of the three IMCO Conventions depends on congressional action. An international
agreement ratified by the United States has the force of law, and
inconsistent statutes are preempted. 2 9 In addition, consideration
of a convention or treaty prompts Congress to make interstitial
adjustments in pending legislation to cover interests not protected
by the agreement. The resulting federal law may preempt a
state's ability to adopt a particular form of regulation. Thus far,
in response to the IMCO agreements, the Coast Guard has
adopted design and operating procedure regulations which are
consistent with requirements of the 1973 Convention,3 0 and Congress is currently considering ratification of the Liability Convention and the Fund Convention. 31 In addition, two bills are pend32
ing that would create a domestic oil pollution fund.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARINE
OIL POLLUTION

A. FEDERAL POLLUTION STATUTES
Federal statutes and regulations attempt to prevent spills by
a variety of means. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
25.

Done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 712 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as Convention-Compensation Fund].

26. Id. art. 10-15, at 720-23.
27. Id. art. 3-5, at 714-17. See Lettow, supra note 16, at 614-25;
Makovsky, supra note 24, at 61; Wood, An Integrated International and
Domestic Approach to Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7
J. M&rImE L. & Com. 1, 14-15 (1975).
28. Convention-Compensation Fund, supra note 25, art. 4; 'see
Makovsky, supra note 24, at 61.
29. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920).
30. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,280 (1975). See text accompanying notes 79-84
infra.

31. See Wood, supranote 27, at 12-20.
32.

See notes 208-12 infra and accompanying text.
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Amendments of 197233 (FWPCA) attack the problem directly by
prohibiting harmful land and water discharges and by imposing
liability for the costs of cleaning up. The Ports and Waterways
Safety Act 4 also attacks the problem directly by authorizing the
Coast Guard to set vessel design and operation regulations.
Admiralty navigation rules designed to avoid collisions seek the
same end through indirect measures.3 5
1.

ProhibitedDischarges

Federal regulation of oil and hazardous substances discharge
is authorized by section 311 of the FWPCA.38 Section 311 prohibits vessel and on-shore facility3 7 discharges of oil and hazardous substances "harmful to the public health or welfare, including
but not limited to fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private
property, shorelines and beaches, 38s a definition based on injury
to humans and human use of productive flora and fauna. Most
33. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of Oct. 18,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
(Supp. V 1975)).
34. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of July 10, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227; 46 U.S.C. § 391a
(Supp. V 1975) (amending 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970)).
35. See notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of prior federal legislation and the legislative history of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 25,
the basis of the present section, see Swan, International and National
Approaches to Oil Pollution Responsibility: An Emerging Regime for a
Global Problem, 50 ORu. L. REv. 504, 547-62 (1971); Note, Liability for
Oil Pollution Clean-Up and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
55 CORNELL L. REv. 973 (1970).
37. The 1972 Amendments extend federal jurisdiction over water
pollution beyond the mean high tide line, the traditional extent of federal
jurisdiction over navigable waters. P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393
F. Supp. 1370, 1381 (D.D.C. 1975). "By recognizing federal authority to
act when offensive matter is discharged from 'any point source,' 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14), the government is authorized to prevent the entry of pollutants into navigable waters." Id. See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), for an analysis
of the maximum extent of federal jurisdiction over water pollution under
the commerce clause. Discharges from shore facilities into a non-navigable tributary of a navigable waterway are also within the Act. United
States v. American Cyanamid Co., 480. F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Mackin Constr. Co., 388 F. Supp. 478 (D. Mass. 1975).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (3), (4) (Supp. V 1975). According to the
National Academy of Sciences, land-based activities contribute 54 percent
of oil pollution introduced into the oceans, compared to 35 percent attributable to vessels. NATiONAL AcAmmEor ScIENcEs, supra note 6, at
1-16.
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reported spill damage has been to the aesthetic quality of beach
areas or to shellfish and seabirds, and would thus be covered
by this definition. It is not clear, however, that this definition
encompasses damage to the stability of the ecosystem which
occurs over the long run. The National Academy of Sciences, for
example, has reported that certain components of spilled oil may
make their way into higher link in the food chain, man included,
but that "[t]here is insufficient information about percentages
of which components of various types of oils enter food chains
and about their ultimate fate." 39 In practice, however, the
theoretical limitations of the section 311 definition are not a
serious problem. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has defined "harmful" broadly enough to encompass small spills
which alone are not dangerous, but whose cumulative impact may
be. EPA regulations define harmful amounts of oil as those
which "violate applicable water quality standards" 40 or "cause
a film or sheen or discoloration of the surface of the water or ad1-41
joining shorelines ....
The visible sheen test is logically suggested by the properties
and harmful effects of oil. Although the toxicity of oils vary,
most oils form surface sheens, and much damage to marine life
results from contact with the sheen. 42 Equating harmfulness
or ScIECEs, supra note 6, at 16.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (a) (1975).
41. Id. § 110.3 (b). "Sheen" is defined as "an irridescent appearance on the surface of the water." Id. § 110.1(1). For an analysis
of the sheen standard, see Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution
Control, in FEDERAL ENvONmENTAL LAw 682, 750-53 (E. Doglin & T.
Guilbert ed. 1974).
42. Regulations which give similarly fair notice to dischargers of
hazardous chemicals are more difficult to formulate. Most chemicals
do not form a sheen; the injury resulting from a discharge of chem-

39. NATIONAL AcADmmv

icals is caused by direct toxic action of soluble fractions. To complicate

matters further, the degree of harm is a function of the chemical's concentration in the water and the characteristics of the receiving water.
Because harmfulness of a chemical discharge is a much more complex
quality than harmfulness of an oil spill, it is not possible to rely on a
standard as simple and automatic as the sheen test to determine which
discharges are prohibited. On the other hand, to determine after proof
of actual injury on a case-by-case basis whether a discharge of chemicals
is harmful would undermine the effectiveness of the Act. Any regulation
must therefore represent some evaluation based on the compound characteristics of the chemical of the probability of damage or harm to representative water bodies. Since the section requires the EPA to define
harmful discharges of hazardous substances as those which "present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare," 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975), they understandably have been
slow to implement the hazardous substance provisions of section 311.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:63

with the existence of the sheen provides fair notice of the kinds
of oil discharges that are prohibited, and thus is a practical
standard for the regulation of oil spills.
2.

FederalRole in Cleanup and Damage Recovery

Cleanup, rather than compensation, is the basic purpose of
the FWPCA; the 1972 Amendments provide no private rights of
action. In many cases, of course, simply cleaning up the spill
will prevent or redress damage to private and public shoreland
owners. The Coast Guard, for example, has sometimes replaced
sand tarred by a spill as part of a clean-up operation. In the
main, however, the federal scheme, like similar international programs, 4 3 is largely a reaction to the Torrey Canyon disaster and

focuses on minimizing the damage which results when a large
ship runs aground. Under the FWPCA the federal government
can either choose to remove any discharge or shift the responsibility to the owner or operator of a vessel or onshore facility
44
able to perform the job.

If a marine disaster poses a substantial threat of a pollution
hazard to public health, fish, or shoreline use, the federal government may, in addition to coordinating all private and public
action, summarily destroy a vessel. 4 5 Thus, for example, the
On December 30, 1975 the EPA issued a set of proposed regulations
setting forth its chosen methodology:
Substances are divided into four categories on the basis of relative hazard to the environment. The smallest common commercial container size (one pound/.454 grams) was then defined as
the harmful quantity for all members of the most highly toxic
category. Other categories were therefore assigned harmful

quantities on a proportional basis. If the upper aquatic toxicity
of a category was ten times higher than the upper limit of the
preceding more toxic category, then the harmful quantity was
set ten times larger....
Proposed Environmental Protection Agency Regulations on Determination of Harmful Quantities of Hazardous Substances, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,982,
59,984 (1975).
Because any regulation must incorporate some presumption about
the probability of damage, the regulations finally adopted by the EPA
will be controversial. Environmentalists will attack the estimate of
damage as too low, while shippers will make the opposite attack. Still,
the proposed regulations seem rational enough to withstand judicial scrutiny, provided they are supported by an adequate scientific record. See
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1975), a case involving the classification of toxic substances under section
307 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. § 1317 (a) (6) (Supp. V 1975).
43. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
45. Id. § 1321 (d).
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Navy could be ordered to bomb a vessel to sink it. Summary
abatement is not at the expense of the vessel but "shall be a
cost incurred by the United States Government ... ."46 This
section adopts the common law rule that private property may
be destroyed without compensation by the government in an
47
emergency situation.
As part of a National Contingency Plan drafted to allocate
clean-up and containment responsibilities among the various
federal agencies, 48 the Great Lakes are under the jurisdiction of
the Coast Guard. Under Coast Guard regulations, each shoreland
facility must prepare a spill prevention and control manual. 49
Since each spill presents different problems, however, the plans
will have limited utility apart from ensuring that needed equipment and manpower are available. Moreover, at present, spill
clean-up technology is primitive, albeit evolving. According
to the Environmental Impact Statement prepared for the Superior, Wisconsin tank farm, it
is presently possible to control and clean up a spill of 100,000
barrels only if it occurs in a relatively confined area, such as a
small enclosed bay or channel- and only if a well organized
and equipped work force arrived at the spill within the first few
hours or so ....
Containment and cleanup of a 100,000 barrel
off-shore spill would be virtually impossible with present day

equipment unless calm weather and current conditions were

present for a week or more and state-of-the-art skimming ves50

sels were readily available.

3.

Liability Limitations
a. Liability Limitations for Clean-up Costs

The federal government is not primarily responsible for the
costs of cleaning up a spill. At the heart of the 1972 Amendments
46. Id.

47. In United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), the Court

held that the United States Army need not compensate the owners of an
oil terminal in the Philippines which was destroyed in 1941 as Japanese
troops were entering Manila. Relying on an earlier case, Jurague Iron
Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909), which denied recovery for the
destruction of a Cuban factory thought to house the germs of a contagious disease, Chief Justice Vinson wrote: "[Tihe common law had
long recognized that in times of imminent peril-such as when a fire
threatened a whole community-the sovereign could, with immunity,
destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of
many more could be saved." 344 U.S. at 154.
48. See note 90 infra.
49. 33 C.F.R. §§ 154.300-.330 (1975).
50. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 21, at 62.
See generally Lettow, supra note 16, at 634-35. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21,
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is section 331 (f) which imposes strict liability for all discharges,
subject to four defenses, 51 and enforces this liability by a maritime lien on vessels. In return for the imposition of strict liability, vessel owners and operators are given the benefit of limited
liability. Amounts recovered by the federal government cannot
exceed $100 per gross ton or $14,000,000

whichever is less. 52

If the discharge is the result of willful negligence or willful
conduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner, however,
the government may recover all the costs of the cleanup.53 With
regard to onshore facilities, the government is given a federal
cause of action but does not have a lien, and liability is limited
to $8,000,000.5 4 To ensure that vessels can meet their responsibilities within these limitations, the Federal Maritime Commission requires a Certificate of Financial Responsibility which may
be granted only upon showing both an accurate figure for gross
registered tonnage of the vessel and the insurer's verification of
requisite coverage. 55 Failure to comply with these regulations
may result in denial of Federal Maritime Agency clearance or

§ 50A (Supp. 1975), requires each terminal facility to maintain a boom

capable of encircling a ship discharging oil.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975). To escape liability the
owner or operator must prove that the discharge was caused solely by
an act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the United States
Government, or an act or omission of a third party, regardless of whether
such acts or omissions were negligent. Two cases have construed the
third and fourth defenses. The court in Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 373
F. Supp. 839 (D. Me. 1974), said in dictum that if the United States negligently maintains buoys or negligently fails to contain the flow of oil from
a vessel, the United States is liable to the same extent that a private person would be liable in tort. Thus, it is potentially liable to owners of
shore property, commercial fishermen, and the state. In Burgess the ship
owners and others made the imaginative but unsuccssful argument
that by promulgating oil spill contingency plans, the government caused
them to rely on the availability of clean-up equipment and personnel on
shore. When a spill occurred the shipowners were entitled to indemnity because the government was liable for damages incurred by
third parties as a result of the inadequacy of the plans or failure
to comply with them. In United States v. General Motors, 403 F. Supp.
1151 (D. Conn. 1975), the court imposed a civil penalty on the owner
of an abandoned factory, which was being patrolled by the owner, for
a discharge caused by vandals who broke into the plant and opened fuel
storage tanks.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
53. Id. Legislative history not surprisingly sheds little light on the
standard of liability incorporated by the term "willful." For a brief discussion of possible instances of willful negligence, see Swan, supra note
36, at 555-58.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
55. 46 C.F.R. 88 542.3-.5 (1975).
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Coast Guard refusal of entry into any port or navigable waters
of the United States. 56
Liability limitations have historically been determined with
reference to the private marine insurance market. 57 Both
IMCO's and the federal government's decisions to base their liability limitations on those set by commercial insurers reflect a
policy judgment that the potential benefits of subjecting shipowners and charters to unlimited liability are outweighed by the
costs.58 Private insurers have been steadily increasing their
limits since the Torrey Canyon; 59 the current limit is $25,000,000.60
Since liability limitations affect the competitive positions of fleets
around the world, they cannot be set with an eye toward environmental effects alone. Moreover, modern liability limitation provisions must be integrated with older limitation statutes that
were not designed to balance environmental and economic
factors.
b.

Liability Limitations for Personal Injury and Property
Damage

The most important of the older federal statutes limiting
maritime liability is the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 61
which is an indirect subsidy to the United States Merchant Marine. Under this Act, a shipowner may, regardless of fault, limit
his liability in a personal injury or property damage action to the
value of the vessel after the accident.( 2 This leaves open the
possibility that one who owns a vessel at fault or who is chargeable with privity of knowledge may nonetheless avoid payment.
56. Id. § 542.10.
57. Lipeles, Oil: A Study of Pollution Insurance and Liability Limit
Laws (Oct. 10, 1975) (unpublished study by the Environmental Policy
Institute).
58. Healy & Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution,1 J. AWn== L. & CoM.
57 (1970), argue, for example, that unlimited liability will drive independent carriers out of the market and thus raise the price of petroleum
products.
59. Lipeles, supra note 57, at 29-31.
60. Id. at S-5. A recent study by the Environmental Policy Institute concludes that reinsurers have increased their coverage without increasing their effective exposure, thus raising the possibility that commercial insurers can profitably assume greater risks. Id. at 31. Others
have argued that the international marine insurance market has the financial capacity to insure against considerably larger losses than it now
does. See Bergman, No Fault Liability For Oil Pollution Damage, 5 T.
MAuTIm L. & CoM. 1, 38-50 (1973).
61. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1970).
62. Id. § 183 (a).
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To use a celebrated example, after the Torrey Canyon went
aground, its owners valued the tanker at fifty dollars, equivalent
to the value of a lifeboat. 68 The liability provisions of the 1972
Act, superceding those of the 1851 Act for dean-up costs, take
away from the shipping industry some of the subsidy conferred
by the earlier statute. Property and personal injury damages
remain subject to the 1851 limitations. Because liability for
clean-up costs under the FWPCA is enforced by a maritime lien,
shipowners would be liable to personal injury and property
damage claimants only to the extent that the remaining value
of the vessel exceeded either the actual costs of cleanup or the
64
FWPCA monetary limitations.
4.

Monetary Penalties

Catastrophic spills are eagily detected, but small spills, especially of hazardous substances, are difficult to detect, 65 creating
a risk that a number of spills whose cumulative effect may be
serious will remain unknown and unremedied. 6 The unlikelihood of detecting small spills is an obvious disincentive to
efforts by owners of vessels and shore facilities to prevent
spills or to remedy the resulting damage. Although increased
manpower commitments by the Coast Guard provide a partial
solution, the 1972 Amendments do not rely on greater policing
67
efforts alone, but make it a crime for the person in charge of
63. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
64. G. GMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-4 (b), at
828-29 (2d ed. 1975). The relationship between the liability limitations
of the 1972 Amendments and state spill damage recovery legislation is
discussed at text accompanying notes 164-207 infra.
65. See discussion note 42 supra.
66. In United States v. W.B. Enterprises, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 420
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court, allowing recovery of a civil penalty for a 2530 gallon spill, noted: "It does not matter that the quantum of damage
is incapable of precise measurement." Id. at 423.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (5) (Supp. V 1975). "In charge" was construed by a federal district court to exclude a negligent tank truck driver
who sat in his truck while fuel overflowed during a delivery. The purchaser had no guage on its tank, and thinking that the tank was low,
prematurely ordered more fueL This was sufficient to put the purchaser
as well as the truck driver at fault. The court, applying ordinary sales
law, concluded that "the tank itself was the discharging facility, and
that, in spite of defendant's duty of oversight, it was not in its charge."
More generally, Judge Aldrich reasoned:
I appreciate the government's interest in having an oil spill reported immediately, but this interest does not serve to define
who was "in charge," or vary the natural meaning of that term,
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a vessel or facility to fail to inform the appropriate federal agency
of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance.6 8 Corporations
are "persons" under the Act, 69 and may be fined for failure to

report a spill. When the federal government learns from any
source that a spill has occurred, it may remove the substance
and recover the actual costs of the cleanup from the discharger
or third party responsible. If a hazardous substance is involved
and nonremovable, a variable penalty, computed by taking into
account the toxicity, degradability and dispersal characteristics of
the substance, may be recovered.70 In addition, a per occurrence
civil penalty of up to $5000 may be assessed against a dis71
charger of oil or hazardous substances in harmful amounts.
Assessment of the $5000 penalty Will often be based on evidence furnished under the mandatory reporting provision of the
statute; hence, if the penalty is characterized as criminal, it
arguably conflicts with the privilege against self-incrimination
at least where individuals, rather than corporations, are involved.7 2 Despite congressional attempts to eliminate this constitutional barrier by providing that any evidence obtained
through notification shall not be used against the informant in a
"In charge" is at once broader, and narrower, than the government perhaps conceives. It is broad because it covers the party
in charge of the facility even though he had nothing to do with
the spill. It is narrower, in that it does not include everyone
who participates in the act. I am aware that in the legislative
history there is reference to the fact that the person intended
to report is the one "operationally responsible for... the facility." However, this term, if to be looked to at all, must be read
in context with the statutory term "in charge." One having a
mere temporary connection is not "operationally responsible" in
that sense.
The basic difference is illustrated by the cases of United
States v. Gainey, 1965, 380 U.S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754, 13 L. Ed. 2d
658, and United States v. Ramano, 1965, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.Ct.
279, 15 L. Ed. 2d 210. In Gainey the Court held that a defendant's presence at the scene of an illegal still justified an inference
(and hence a statutory presumption), that he was engaged in
operating it. However, in Romano the Court held that it did
not warrant the further inference that he was in possession. I
cannot look to legislative history, particularly of a criminal statute, to enlarge to mere contact a phrase that clearly denotes possession and dominion.
United States v. Mackin Constr. Co., 388 F. Supp. 478, 480-81 (D. Mass.
1975) (citations omitted).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Id. § 1321(a) (7). See Apex Oil v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1976).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. V 1975).
71. Id. § 1321(b) (6).
72. The privilege against self-incrimination has been held inapplicable to corporations. See United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124
(5th Cir. 1972).
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criminal prosecution and that only a civil penalty shall be assessed
against a discharger,73 the three federal district courts that have
heard constitutional challenges to the penalty have split on the
issue of whether the sanction is criminal or civil.7 4

Because the

constitutionality of the fine is an open question 75 and the
amount of the fine is too small to make the government whole
for the cost of cleaning up a spill or to pose a significant deterrent to dischargers, the penalty serves little purpose as part of
the statutory scheme.

B. REGULATION OF SmP DESIGN Am OPERATION
1.

Statutes and Administrative Regulations
Subjecting tanker owners to strict liability, even with the

accompanying limitation of liability, 76 will provide substantial

incentives to take spill prevention measures. The high cost of
detecting spills on the high seas and open waters, however, is
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (5) (Supp. V 1975). Congressional classification of a penalty as civil or criminal is, of course, subject to judicial
review. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
74. In United States v. LeBoeuf Brother Towing Co., 377 F. Supp.
558 (E.D. La. 1975), the court held that the penalty is criminal. The
decision is commented upon favorably in Comment, The Compulsory
Self-Disclosure and Penalty Provisions of the 1972 Amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Catch-22 at Sea, 49 TuL. L. REv.
1124 (1975). For decisions holding that the penalty is civil, see United
States v. Mar-Tee Contractors, Crim. No. 75-156 (D.N.J., Jan. 30,
1976), 8 ERC 1925; United States v. General Motors, 403 F. Supp. 1151
(D. Conn. 1975).
75. The conclusion of the court in United States v. General Motors
Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975), that "the civil penalty established by 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) is remedial in nature, and can be imposed in administrative or civil proceedings in harmony with the fifth
and sixth amendments," id. at 1163, is questionable; an equally obvious
purpose of the statute is to deter harmful conduct. The court's answer
to this argument is not wholly convincing:
The two overriding purposes of the civil penalty provision
of the FWPCA appear to be the elimination of oil, spills through
deterrence, and the collection of revenue to support federal
clean-up efforts and the administration of the act. The civil
penalty has an effect akin to punishment, but this is an unavoidable by-product of these purposes. The Court cannot substitute
its own judgment for the informed choice of the Congress by
interpreting this by-product to be the primary purpose of the
statute.
Id. For a discussion of the difficult constitutional questions involved in
characterizing a penalty as civil or criminal, see Clark, Civil and Criminal Penaltiesand Forfeitures: A Framework for ConstitutionalAnalysis,
60 MnNN. L. REv. 381 (1976).
76. See notes 51-64 supra and accompanying text.
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causing international regulatory bodies 77 and the federal government to institute direct regulation of ship design and operation
to supplement the indirect regulation accomplished by imposition
of strict liability. Segregated ballast systems7" and double
bottoms are the major design innovations suggested, for they
would in theory eliminate most intentional oily ballast discharges
and prevent another Torrey Canyon disaster.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 authorizes the
Coast Guard to establish such design and construction standards,
consonant with those of the 1973 IMCO Convention for the prevention or mitigation of damage to the marine environment, and
to promulgate rules regarding vessel maneuvering and stopping
ability in hazardous circumstances.7 9 In late 1975 the Coast
Guard adopted standards applicable as of January 1, 1976 to any
ship entering United States navigable waters.8 0 Consistent with
the 1973 IMCO Convention, the regulations require segregated
ballast systems8 ' but not double bottoms on tankers.8 2 The Coast
77. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
78. For a description of segregated ballast systems, see Cummins,
Logue, Tollison, &Willett, Oil Tanker Pollution Control: Design Criteria
vs. Effective Liability Assessment, 7 J. MlARrmvm L. & Com. 169, 173-74
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Cummins].
79. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
80. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,280 (1975). For background on the regulations,
see Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce on the Safety of Supertankers,94th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1975).

81. Segregated ballast systems are required by the 1973 IMCO Convention for new tankers of over 70,000 dwt. See note 18 supra. The
segregated ballast regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,280 (1975), have already
survived a challenge by the Natural Resources Defense Council in a suit
alleging that the requirements fall short of the congressional intention
expressed in the statute. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Coleman, 411 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1975). The court assumed that the
statute imposed a legal duty on the Coast Guard to write the best possible regulation on the subject, but concluded, after giving due weight to
the expertise of the agency and the general "heated debate" over regulation in the area, that it was not possible for them to do better. Since
the Coast Guard was in the process of revising the regulation, the court
refused to set a timetable for the publication of a new regulation.
Proponents of the double bottom requirement argue that segregated
ballast systems will reduce intentional but not accidental discharges,
whereas double bottoms can significantly reduce accidental discharges.
This argument is corroborated by Coast Guard studies which show that
in 31 tanker casualties resulting in bottom damage and pollution to
United States waters, a double bottom design would have reduced by
85 percent the amount of oil discharged. Hearings on Proposed Regulations ... to Require that All Large Tankers Contracted After Jan. 1,
1976, Entering United States TerritorialWaters Be Equipped with Segregated Ballast Tanks Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Naviga-
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Guard safety regulations are also similar to the IMCO standards"
in that they are intended to prevent disastrous spills from supertankers and thus will not have a direct impact on the relatively
small ships that traverse Lake Superior. The largest vessels on
the lake weigh only 12,000 dwt, 8000 dwt short of the minimum
weight covered by the most stringent double bottom, segregated
84
ballast legislation introduced in the Congress.
2.

Admiralty Rules of Navigation

Oil tanker collisions are an increasing problem in the
crowded shipping lanes and harbors of the world. Navigation of
supertankers is extremely difficult and the level of seamanship
on ships flying flags-of-convenience, such as Liberia, poses serious
tion of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong.,

1st Sess. 39-40 (1973).

The Coast Guard is still studying the question

of double, bottoms, see Pedrick, Liability, Compensation and Prevention
of Oil Spills: A North American Perspective, 1 EARTH L.J. 301, 313
(1975), but currently maintains that such a requirement, which would
increase the cost of supertankers by nine percent at a time when the
United States merchant fleet needs massive subsidies to survive, is im-

practical. A cost-benefit analysis of proposed Coast Guard regulations
requiring segregated ballast systems and partial double bottoms con-

cludes "the benefits come nowhere near matching the costs of double

skin segregated ballast oil tanker design criteria." Cummins, supra
note 78, at 205. When the current unmeasurable costs of undetected discharges on the high seas are considered, however, the authors suggest that
"[i]mposition of design standards may . . . be optimal if the social loss
from tanker pollution is high and polluting activities cannot be monitored and liability assessed at reasonable cost." Id. It is also argued
that the unilateral adoption by the United States of a double bottom
standard would work against the general interest in curbing ocean
pollution, for oil would be shipped in older, less safe flag-of-convenience
tankers. See Hearings,supra note 80, at 2025.
82. The IMCO Convention does not require double bottoms. The
1973 IMCO standards represent one of the few instances in which IMCO
led, rather than followed, the shipping industry in imposing standards
for the United States. The Coast Guard, which at the time of the Convention was considering regulations requiring double bottoms, changed
its position to conform to IMCO. See the comments of Richard Frank,
A Closer Look at Some Issues for Geneva-Oceans Policy, Marine Environment, and Fisheries, 14 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT. L. 56, 67-68 (1975).
83. See note 18 supra.
84. In 1975 Senator Magnuson introduced legislation to require
double bottoms and segregated ballast systems for all vessels of more

than 20,000 dwt engaged in carrying oil to United States ports. Tanker

Safety Improvement Act, S. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CoNG. REC.
707-08 (1975). The average size of tankers built between 1920 and
1945 was 12,000 dwt. For a brief history of the evolution of tanker sizes
and tanker management problems generally, see L. KENDALL, THE BusiNESS OF SHiPPING 285-304 (2d ed. 1976).
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problems. "[T]o a disconcerting degree, oil cargoes have been
delivered in recent years by improperly trained and uncertified
officers aboard ships navigating with defective equipment."8' 5
The Rules of Navigation8 6 are derived from the days of sailing
ships, and the general fault standard of "prudent seamanship"
developed under the Rules does not take into account technological developments such as radar and the supertanker. Regulation
under the law of navigation, therefore, has limited potential as
the accidental discharge of oil
a deterrent to conduct that causes
87
and other hazardous substances.
C.

COOPERATION WITH CANADA

The United States and Canada share jurisdiction over Lake
Superior as international waters. Since both countries regard the
Great Lakes as internal waters rather than high seas, regulatory
jurisdiction is further shared between federal and state or pro85. N. MosTERT, SUPERSnnp at 59 (1974).
86. Under admiralty law, a vessel which collides with another vessel is liable if the colliding vessel was at fault. GmmoRE & BLACK, supra
note 64, § 7-2, at 486. The general fault standard, "prudent seamanship,"
has been supplemented by legislation and administrative regulations.
Congress has enacted navigation rules for the Great Lakes and their connecting waters, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-295 (1970), and there are Coast Guard
regulations for Great Lakes navigation. Besides standardizing safety requirements and operating procedures in fog and other dangerous situations, the rules have important legal consequences. Cause in fact must
be established in admiralty before a ship can be held liable for damage.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra, § 7-5, at 494. Under the Pennsylvania rule
if one ship fails to comply with the Rules of Navigation before the collision, to escape liability "the vessel thus cast in fault must prove ...
not only that the fault probably did not but also that it could not have
contributed to causing the collision." Id.
87. There is still no duty to use radar, but all large ships are, of
course, equipped with it. And it has been suggested that as a result
of this adoption of technology "courts will consider them [vessels] unseaworthy if they are lacking in such equipment." Healy, Radar and
the New Collision Regulations, 37 TuL. L. REv. 621, 629 (1963). No case
has so held, however. One court suggested in dictum that if radar is
aboard, it is negligent to fail to use it unless visibility is perfect and
actual harm might have resulted if the master left the bridge to consult
the radar. Marcoeano Compania Naviera, S.A. v. S.S. Verdi, 438 F.2d
854, 856 (2d Cir. 1970). The extent to which radar information replaces
the traditional navigation information of sight and sound is a complex
question. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1051-91 (1970), enforced for all United States vessels on the
high seas but not on the Great Lakes, requires a vessel in restricted visibility to go at moderate speed. Under the Annex to Rule 16, radar is
a factor to be taken into account in determining what is moderate speed,
if radar will provide information about another vessel or obstacle such
as an iceberg. Id. § 1094(b). See Meadows, The Radar Annex and Rule
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vincial governments. The two countries have a long history of
cooperation concerning Great Lakes water pollution.88
A 1909 treaty with Great Britain established the International
Joint Commission (IJC).S9 While the IJC has no direct authority to regulate pollution, it may at the request of both governments investigate problems and make recommendations which
must then be implemented by compatible American and Canadian
legislation. IJC concern with vessel pollution on the Great Lakes
resulted in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement which
expressed a joint commitment to a number of measures designed
to prevent ship and onshore discharges of oil and hazardous
substances. 90
In addition, Canadian pollution prevention legislation complements United States statutes and regulations. The Canada
Shipping Act 9 ' establishes uniform vessel design and performance
standards and provides for post-spill liability. 92 A shipowner is
strictly liable in admiralty for the costs of cleaning up or prevent16 of the Regulations For Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960, as They
Affect Navigation in Restricted Visibility, 5 WILLA VME L.J. 399 (1969).
88. The definitive analysis of Canadian-United States pollution control cooperation is Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study
in United States-CanadianEnvironmental Cooperation, 70 MIcH. L. Rv.
469 (1972).

89. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, 2450
(1909), T.S. No. 548 (effective May 13, 1910).
90. Agreement between Canada and the United States of America
on Great Lakes Water Quality, April 15, 1972, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 301,
T.LA.S. No. 7312, reprinted in J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTMNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 127 (1974). For example, Annex 3, which

deals with vessel design, construction, and operation, states:
Compatible regulations shall be adopted for the prevention
of discharges into the Great Lakes System of harmful quantities
of oil and hazardous polluting substances from vessels in accordance with the following principles:
(a) Discharges of harmful quantities of oil or hazardous
polluting substances shall be prohibited and made subject to appropriate penalties;
(b) As soon as any person in charge has knowledge of any
discharge or harmful quantities of oil or hazardous polluting
substances, immediate notice of such discharge shall be given
to the appropriate agency in the jurisdiction where the discharge
occurs; failure to give this notice shall be made subject to appropriate penalties.
Id. at 142. On June 19, 1974, the two countries signed a Joint CanadaUnited States Marine Contingency Plan "for spills of oil and other noxious substances," [1974] 25 U.S.T. 1280, T.I.A.S. No. 7861. See RovMn,

1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRAcTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-70.
91. An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act, 19-20 Eliz. 2 c. 27

§ 736 et seq., at 543 (1971).

92. Id. §§ 736-69, at 543-75.
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ing the spread of a spill as well as for all "actual loss or damage
incurred by her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any
other person resulting from the discharge of a pollutant into
waters to which this Part applies .... "93 Third party acts
which contribute to the pollution, acts of war or God, intentional
acts done to cause harm, and government negligence in the maintenance of navigational aids are defenses that absolve the shipowner.0 4 Like the United States water pollution statute,95 the
Shipping Act provides for limited liability.96 The Canadian
legislation also establishes a Maritime Pollution Claims Fund, fed
by damage action recoveries and export and import fees on oil
shipped to and from Canada,9 7 for the recovery of civil damages.
The federal government, a province, or any other person having
a claim against the owner of the ship or cargo may apply to the
fund for compensation for injuries sustained as a result of a spill
when the ship that caused the pollution cannot be identified.98
IV. STATE REGULATION OF MARINE POLLUTION
As a general proposition concerning the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between the federal and state governments, it
may be said that direct methods of preventing spills, such as
vessel design and operating standards, are within the federal
province, while the states are confined to such indirect methods
as liability rules governing the recovery of post-spill damages. 99
Although state power may be thus circumscribed, a regulatory
strategy confined to compensating public and private parties
suffering spill damage may still offer a high level of environmental protection.
Although many writers properly emphasize the potential
risks of long term marine damage from oil spills, available scientific information suggests that the certain hazards posed by oil
spills-damage to fish, wildlife and beach property-are not irre93. Id. § 743(1) (d), at 553.
94. Id. § 774 (1), at 555.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
96. 19-20 Eliz. 2, c. 27, § 744(4), at 556 (1971).
97. Id. § 746, at 558-59.
98. Id. § 754(1), at 562. A fisherman, for example, who cannot
otherwise recover may apply to the fund for compensation. Id. § 755,
at 563-64.
99. See notes 164-207 infra and accompanying text; Swan, American Waterways: Florida Oil Pollution Legislation Makes It Over the
FirstHurdle, 5 J. Munrmm L. & Com. 77, 91 (1973).
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parable. 0 0° Thus, although a case exists for attempting to minimize all spills by direct as well as indirect regulation, a compensatory plan may be enough to restore damaged resources. Because of the limited protection of property and economic interests afforded by the FWPCA, however, several states have gone
further and adopted legislation which blurs the distinction between direct and indirect regulation. This legislation raises important questions concerning the scope of permissible state regulatory authority. Moreover, states may attempt to achieve what
they may be unable to do directly, for example, prohibiting tankers from entering a port, by indirect means such as coastal zone
land use controls that deny use of the coast for reception facilities.
A. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR STATE SPILL LIABILITY LEGISLATION
The power of a littoral state to preserve the quality of Great
Lakes water stems from its sovereignty over navigable waters
within its jurisdiction.' 0 ' Because all members of the public
share in their use, the state is said to hold navigable waters and
the beds underlying them in trust for the benefit of all citizens. -0 2 Historically, the public trust doctrine has been invoked
in situations where a state attempted to transfer ownership of
trust lands to private parties. Courts have created a patchwork
03
of restraints on the ability of the state to make such transfers.
To restrain the states in the name of the public interest, courts
have imposed a higher burden on the states to justify disposition
of trust resources to private parties than they have imposed with
regard to other state-controlled resources. 0 4 Two principles
relevant to the ability of upper Great Lakes states to adopt a
100. See note 6 supra.
101. See People v. State Tax Comm., 247 N.Y. 9, 159 N.E. 703 (1928);
Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N.W. 395
(1907). State jurisdiction over the Great Lakes is subject to federal
power in matters involving treaties or international or interstate commerce. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
102. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), held that the
original 13 states succeeded to rights held by the Crown in its sovereign
capacity; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), held
that new states have the same rights under the equal footing doctrine.
The public trust doctrine and the complex problems of public and private
ownership of submerged lands are analyzed in Maloney & Ausness, The
Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal
Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. R!v. 185 (1974).
103. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
104. For a comprehensive discussion of the cases, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine of NaturalResources Law, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
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spill prevention strategy for Lake Superior have emerged from
the public trust cases. First, the definition of public rights in
navigable waters has been expanded to include not only navigation, but also recreation and perhaps maintenance of environmental quality as well. 0 5 Second, since the state is charged with
protecting public rights in natural resources, the trust doctrine
reinforces the sovereign's discretion to choose environmental protection over development as a desired use of the lake.
Lake Superior's bed and waters are held in trust by the
littoral states, subject to the federal government's paramount
authority to regulate navigation under the commerce and admiralty powers. 106 Within these constraints, the states have the
power to decide how the waters of Lake Superior shall be allocated among competing uses, 0 7 provided that power is exercised
105. The strongest case supporting the recognition of public rights
for environmental uses is Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). See Note, Environmental Law-Expanding the
Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REV. 316 (1972); Comment,
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 781-87 (1970).
106. See Hililhouse, The Federal Law of Water Resources Development, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 844, 852-61 (E. Doglin & T. Guil-

bert. ed. 1974). For a discussion of federal preemption, see text accompanying notes 221-47 infra. An excellent recent survey of the history
of the public trust doctrine comes to the same conclusion that I have:
the function of the doctrine is not so much to restrain state legislatures
as to remind them that they have the discretion to opt for environmental protection. Deveney & Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRNT L.J. 13 (1976). The authors

of this survey note that:
Arguments phrased in terms of absolutes ignore the primary
lesson learned from ten years of attempts to develop and manage the coastal area rationally: the land-sea interface is necessarily an area of conflict between bona fide competing interests.
This conflict cannot be resolved by the use of such historical
talismans as the public trust or by simple appeal to supposed
moral imperatives and uncritical sentiment rooted in myth
In addition, they add that "[t]he public trust doctrine and the jus publicum are not in themselves" positive principles of resource allocation;
"they represent only a continuing commitment of the state not necessarily to alienate the coastal area resources of the state from public uses."
Deveney & Title, supra at 80-81.
107. The Supreme Court has made clear that a state subjected to
pollution from beyond its borders can require the offending state to reduce the pollution. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1906), Justice Holmes described the state's interest in its resources as
"quasi-sovereign" and wrote that a state "has the last word as to whether
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air." Id. at 237. More recently, in Illinois v. Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1971), Justice Douglas suggested in dictum that "a state
...may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not
be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neigh-
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reasonably. In the context of environmental protection, regulations designed to minimize risks of an activity are vulnerable to
attack as arbitrary and capricious unless justified by adequate
scientific findings of harm caused by the activity.1 8 Recent federal cases, however, give legislative and administrative bodies
broad discretion to make a risk-benefit analysis in establishing
environmental standards. 0 9 The Supreme Court of California
has taken a similar view. Quoting with approval a discussion
of the general environmental risks of marine pollution, the court
in People ex Tel. Younger v. Superior Court"" held that the
state can recover damages for unquantifiable harms:
The harm caused not only to the waters themselves but to wildlife and marine life dependent upon them as well as its pervasive and continued effect defies a general assessment of damages
to say nothing in terms of their calculation in terms of money.
Thus the monies collected civilly ...

operate to more fully

compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an
amount equivalent to the harm done."'1
B.

RECOVERY PURSUANT To GENERAL WATER PoLLumoN LEGISLATION

General water pollution legislation is one method by which
the littoral states may guard against oil pollution on Lake
bor." Id. at 107. See also Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S.
109 (1971).
108. See Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, Civ. No.
73-2205, (D.C. Cir., decided March 19, 1976), 8 ERC 1785.
109. An example of a court's willingness to uphold state regulation
where the harm sought to be avoided is not certain is found in the Eighth
Circuit opinion in the Reserve Mining case.
In assessing probabilities in this case, it cannot be said that the
probability of harm is more likely than not. Moreover, the level
of probability does not readily convert into a prediction of consequences. On this record it cannot be forecast that the rates of
cancer will increase from drinking Lake Superior water or
breathing Silver Bay air. The best that can be said is that the
existence of this asbestos contaminant in air and water gives rise
to a reasonable medical concern for the public health. The public's exposure to asbestos fibers in air and water creates some
health risk. Such a contaminant should be removed.
As we demonstrate in the following sections of the opinion,
the existence of this risk to the public justifies an injunction decree requiring abatement of the health hazard on reasonable
terms as a precautionary and preventive measure to protect the
public health.
Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492,
520 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, Civ. No. 73-2205, (D.C. Cir., decided March 19, 1976), 8 ERC
1785; Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
110. 16 Cal. 3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1976).
111. Id. at 137-39, 544 P.2d at 1326-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
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Superior and the other Great Lakes. Minnesota's water pollution
legislation, for example, provides sanctions which are adequate
to deal with small-scale spills. Minnesota law defines two standards for imposition of liability for a spill. First, "pollution" is
defined broadly:
'Pollution of water," "water pollution," or "pollute the
water" means: (a) the discharge of any pollutant into any
waters of the state or the contamination of any waters of the
state so as to create a nuisance or render such waters unclean,
or noxious, or impure so as to be actually or potentially harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, to domestic, agricultural, commercial, industrial, recreational or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, animals, birds,
fish or other aquatic life; or (b) the man-made or man-induced
alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, or radiological
12
integrity of waters of the state."
This definition is supplemented by the interstate standards, which
provide:
No sewage, industrial waste or other wastes shall be discharged
into any interstate waters of the state so as to cause any nuisance conditions, such as the presence of significant amounts of
floating solids, scum, oil slicks, excessive suspended solids,
material discoloration, obnoxious odors, gas ebullition, deleterious sludge deposits, undesirable slimes or fungus growths,
or other offensive or harmful effects. 1 13
"Other wastes" include oil and chemicals as well as chemical wastes. 114 Violation of any effluent guideline or water
quality standard subjects the discharger to a civil penalty."15
Dischargers also have a duty to notify the state of any spill and
to take steps to minimize the damage. 116 Because the impact
of spills may be cumulative,"17 it is reasonable to expect the
courts to classify a spill of any consequence as a nuisance within
the meaning of the statute. Should the state proceed on the
theory that a spill violates the interstate standards, which include
oil standards, liability may be imposed on the basis of sections six
112. Mnm. STAT. § 115.01(5) (1976).
113. Mimn. P.C.A. Criteria for the Classification of the Interstate
Waters of the State and the Establishment of Standards of Quality and
Purity, 14 Minn. Reg. W.P.C. 15(c) (2) (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Minn. P.C.A. Criteria]. For interstate waters denominated Class A for
purposes of recreation and commercial fishing, concentrations of oil are
limited to 0.5 milligrams per litre. Id. 15 (d) (2).
114. Mn. STAT. § 115.01(4) (1976). Wisconsin has enacted similar
legislation. Wis. STAT. AnN. § 147.015 (3) (West 1974).
115. The statute authorizes a maximum fine of $10,000 per day, plus
compensation to the state for costs of cleanup and damage to flora and
fauna. Mnw. STAT. § 115.071(3) (1976).
116. Id. § 115.061.
117. See note 6 supra.
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and seven of the interstate criteria, which manifest a non-degradation policy. 18
Port facilities may also be siubject to regulation through legislation such as Wisconsin's Pollution Discharge Elimination
System, which prescribes maximum discharges of oil.119 The pro-

posed maximum discharge concentration for the Lakehead terminal in Superior, Wisconsin, for example, is 10 milligrams per
liter.

120

While such general pollution legislation may be useful in
dealing with small-scale spills, it does not adequately deal with
several other aspects of the oil pollution problem. The Minnesota
regulations fail, for example, to provide for measures such as
comprehensive storage and transfer facility licensing, which
would reduce the chances of a major spill occurring. Moreover,
there are no rules governing recovery of clean-up costs, or compensation for damages to state and private parties caused by the
spills.
C.

SPECIFIC LEGISLATION RELATING TO VESSEL POLLUTION

In addition to general water pollution control legislation, the
Great Lakes states have a variety of miscellaneous statutes
directed specifically at vessel pollution. For example, the
Michigan Water Resources Act provides:
(1) A person owning, operating or otherwise concerned in the
operation, navigation, or management of a watercraft operating
on the waters of this state shall not discharge or permit the
discharge of oil or oily wastes from the watercraft into or onto
the waters of this state if the oil or oil wastes threaten to pollute or contribute to the pollution of the waters or adjoining
shorelines or beaches.

118. Minn. P.C.A. Criteria, supra note 113, at 15(a) (6), (7).
Although no case applying these and related provisions has reached
the Minnesota courts, the statute and the intrastate and interstate quality
criteria formed the basis for a settlement between the state and a company whose pipeline, over a three-year period, had experienced numerous spills and ruptures at several locations in the state, causing oil discharge into various state waters. The company agreed to conduct extensive tests on large portions of its pipelines, to install new systems on
several lines to minimize the risk of rupture due to over-pressuring, to
study the sites where oil had been spilled to determine the extent of
water pollution, and to pay the state $25,000 for "alleged" damages.
Water Quality Stipulation Agreement, In re Lakehead Pipeline Co.,
Inc., (May 20, 1975) (on file at iNNESOTA LAW REVIEW).

119. The legislation creating Wisconsin's Pollution Discharge Elimi-

nation System is 1973 Wis. Laws c. 74 § 3, amended 1975 Wis. Laws c.
206, c. 349 (as codified Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 147.02-.23 (West 1974)).
120. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 21, at 64.
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(2) The owner or operator of any watercraft who, whether
directly or through any person concerned in the operation, navigation or management of the watercraft, discharges or permits

or causes or contributes to the discharge of oil or oily wastes
into or onto the waters of this state or adjoining shorelines or
beaches shall immediately remove the oil or oily wastes ....
If the state removes the oil or oily wastes which were discharged by an owner or operator, the watercraft and the owner
or operator are liable to the state for the full amount of the
costs reasonably incurred for its removal. The state may bring
to recover such costs in any
action against the owner or operator
121
court of competent jurisdiction.

The obvious purpose of the damage provision is to allow the state
to control small craft spills and to recover clean-up costs. Despite
broad prohibitions against the discharge of oil, however, state
statutes not integrated with the liability limitations of section 311
of the FWPCA12 2 were not written with the legal problems
of large vessel pollution in mind.
D. STATE SPILL PREVENTION AND RECOVERY LEGISLATION
Since 1970 many coastal states have enacted special legislation

to deal with spills. 123 Although the statutes vary, they generally have three primary objectives-the prevention of ship-toshore spills, the recovery of clean-up costs, and the compensation
of those injured as the result of a spill. To prevent spills resulting from ship-to-shore transfers, states generally license oil reception facilities so that conditions designed to protect the environment may be imposed on their operation. Clean-up costs and
damages are recovered through statutes which impose strict liability. Further, fiscal responsibility requirements are imposed on
tanker owners and terminal operators. Some states have gone
further and have created a fund-sometimes fed only by penalty
recoveries and sometimes by oil transfer taxes-to supplement the
amount of money available for cleanup and damage awards
121. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 323.337 (1975). Wisconsin's oil discharge prohibition is found at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.29(3) (West 1973).
122. See text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
123. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.740 et seq. (1971), § 46.03.822 et seq.
(Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.011 et seq. (Supp. 1976); IE. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 541 et seq. (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE, NAT. REs.
§ 8-1406 et seq. (1974); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21, § 50 et seq.
(1973), § 26 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. AnN. § 58:10-23.3 et seq.

(Supp. 1976); N.Y.E.C.L. §§ 17-1743, 71-1941, 71-1943 (Supp. 1975); N.C.
§ 143-215.77 et seq. (Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 468.780
et seq. (1975); WAsE. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.315 et seq. (Supp. 1975).

GEN. STAT.
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beyond the amounts recoverable from those responsible for a
24

spill.1

The Great Lakes states may wish to follow the example of
the states bordering the oceans or the Gulf of Mexico and enact
similar spill recovery laws, but several major issues must be faced
before they do so. First, legislatures must make a basic policy
judgment as to whether strict liability, the standard adopted by
the coastal states' legislation, is the appropriate standard for the
vessels plying the Great Lakes and for the terminal facilities that
are likely to be built there. Second, legislatures should be
aware of what common law remedies are already available to
provide for spill damage recovery and what deficiencies in
these traditional remedies might be corrected by new legislation.
Third, the enactment of new legislation in this area may raise
significant constitutional questions; the experiences of the coastal
states in meeting challenges to the constitutionality of their spill
recovery legislation may be instructive for legislatures considering such enactments and may illuminate the permissible scope
12 5
of state power.
1.

Strict Liability

The three familiar standards of liability for the recovery of
damages at common law are: (1) the intentional infliction of
harm; (2) the infliction of harm by conduct which is negligent,
that is, where the actor is at fault; and (3) strict and absolute
liability, that is, where the actor causes harm without being
at fault. Strict liability is subject to defenses such as acts of God,
whereas absolute liability allows no such defenses. Although
common law liability standards have long been supplemented by
legislatively and administratively imposed standards of conduct, 2 6 consideration of traditional standards remains essential
to analyzing the effectiveness of current regulatory efforts.
As a general matter, liability for the intentional infliction of
harm is easily justified. In comparison with the losses inflicted,
an activity which intentionally harms another generally has little
social utility. In the case of oil and hazardous substances trans124. See notes 139-154 infra and accompanying text. Because of the
limited amount of oil and other hazardous substances transported on
Lake Superior, see note 3 supra, creation of a fund by Michigan, Minnesota, or Wisconsin, is probably not justified.
125. See text accompanying notes 164-207 infra.
126. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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portation, however, this generalization is not wholly correct;
intentional discharges are often made for the safety of the ship
and the crew. But questions of privilege aside, intentional discharges of oil should be subject to liability.
Liability for the negligent infliction of harm is based on
fault. 27 Whether an actor should be subject to liability for
negligent conduct which injures another is determined by making
a post hoc judgment about the probability of the activity causing
injury, the gravity of the injury, and whether the burden of
imposing adequate preventive measures is economically justifiable. 28 "Under the prevailing theory, unreasonably dangerous
conduct is negligence without any requirement that it be accompanied by any particular state of mind.'1 29 In short, the standards are objective and represent a complex set of policy judgments about loss allocation. In contradistinction to strict liability,
under a negligence theory an actor can, by convincing a judge
or jury that his conduct was reasonable in light of prevailing
130
community or industry standards, avoid liability for injury.
Moreover, defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk are available.' 3 '
In principle, negligence theory provides an adequate basis for
public and private recoveries for damages caused by pollution,
but it is generally agreed that reliance on common law negligence
would allow many injuries to go uncompensated. There is, first,
the practical problem common to all theories of liability of
identifying the source of harm, in this case, pollution. If jurisdiction over a vessel is obtained, the plaintiff in a negligence suit
must prove negligent discharge, a difficult task in light of the
plaintiff's limited access to information. "A shore-bound claimant usually cannot prove negligent seamanship of the vessel's
crew or officers, since he has no friendly witnesses from the
tanker ....
It is indeed seldom [that] the plaintiff [is] able to
prove unseaworthiness from faulty ship construction, especially
since most tankers are built abroad."' 32 For these reasons most
127. See W. PROSSER,
(4th ed. 1971).
128. Id. § 43, at 266.

HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 147

129. 2 F. HARPER &F. JAvmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 16.1, at 897 (1956).

130. Id. § 16.2, at 902-03.
131. Id. §§ 21.1, at 1162-68; 22.1, at 1193-1209.
132. Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to
Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7 J. MAIITimE L. & Com.
1,4 (1975).
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experts on oil pollution
have urged that dischargers be held
33
1
liable without fault.

The common law has long imposed liability on certain classes
of activities that cause harm regardless of whether an actor was
negligent. Scholars have long debated whether courts were
simply classifying certain risks as unreasonable per se, that is,
negligent, or deciding that certain activities, although reasonable
under a negligence standard, should nonetheless be viewed as
posing such a high degree of danger that the actor should bear
the costs of certain injuries as the price of the undertaking. The
debate is still unresolved, and the justification for strict liability
remains controversial despite its increasingly widespread acceptance. Some now support it on the ground that it distributes the
burden of losses fairly, while others support it on the ground of
efficiency, arguing that it will force actors to take extra precautions or modify processes to avoid accidents. 3 4 The most satisfactory rationale for strict liability is that it can promote efficient allocation of resources. Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff
argue that the imposition of liability regardless of fault places
the costs of accidents on those in the best position to make a
benefit-cost analysis between accident costs and accident-avoidance costs and to act on that decision. 13 5 Under this theory either
courts may make ad hoc liability assignments or legislatures may
make categorical judgments. 136 The strength of the CalabresiHirschoff standard of liability, which is derived in large part
from neo-classical welfare economics,13 7 is that the standard if
properly applied will promote efficiency by minimizing the sum
38
of accident costs and accident-avoidance costs.
Strict liability for supertankers is easy to justify. 3 9 Supertankers present great risks to the environment because they use
new and unproven technologies and the rapid implementation
of these new technologies exaggerates the potential for human

J.

133. See Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5
L. & Com. (1973) and authorities cited therein.
134. The argument that strict liability promotes safety precautions

MATm

has been disputed. See R. POSNER, EcoNoanc ANALYSIS OF LAW 92-95
(1972).
135. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test For Strict Liability in
Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
136. See id. at 1067-70.
137. Id. at 1076-84.
138. Id. at 1076.

139. See generally Bergman, supranote 133.
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error.140 The operation of these vessels may legitimately be
classified as an ultrahazardous activity. Because of their presumed utility, however, supertankers have not been banned from
the seas. Permitting tankers to operate while forcing them to
bear the full costs of their operation, including the cost of damages caused by spills,
may determine whether the supertankers
141
are in fact efficient.

The case for strict liability for smaller ships and shore facilities, although not as strong, is justifiable under the CalabresiHirschoff standard. First, because spills do not occur with great
frequency, individual shoreland owners are unlikely to maintain
prevention equipment and chemicals or to purchase insurance.
On the other hand, insurance is readily available to the marine
transportation industry. Second, when a spill occurs, prevention
of loss is best accomplished through collective action. Individual
property owners would incur high transaction costs in organizing ad hoc clean-up programs. Third, it would be neither reasonable nor efficient to force shoreland owners to avoid spill damage
by locating their activities elsewhere. These factors suggest that
a cost-benefit analysis should be made at a high level of generality. Spill victims are unable reasonably to take steps to avoid
the damage and are not in a good position to make a benefit-cost
analysis of risks and preventive measures. Thus, legislatures
might reasonably conclude that tanker owners and operators
should be strictly liable for spill damages because they can most
cheaply meet the costs of avoiding spills. Strict liability, then,
does appear to be a justifiable and appropriate standard for the
vessels and facilities on the Great Lakes.
2.

Common Law Remedies

In addition to strengthening plaintiffs' chances of recovery
by substituting a strict liability standard for the common law
negligence standard, new legislation might correct other deficiencies in traditional common law remedies, where such deficiencies
exist. A plaintiff who suffers an injury to a legally protected
interest as a result of a spill can recover damages either under
140. Supertankers grew "too big much too quickly, without commensurate knowledge of the forces created by their enormous hulls." N.
MOSTERT, SurEsu 76 (1974).
141. Although there are significant differences between them, the arguments made on behalf of strict liability for the SST can be applied to
supertankers. See Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two
Hours, 21 STxw. L, Rsv. 1 (1968).
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state law or in admiralty, 142 but both state law and admiralty
traditionally have not allowed compensation for the full range
of interests actually injured. Thus, although courts have broadened the scope of recoverable damages in recent years 143 and
in some areas the common law does provide an adequate basis
for relief, new legislation may be needed to expand the common law calculus of legally protected interests. Such an expanded range of legally protected interests would not only permit
plaintiffs to recover for more of their damages, but would
also act as a deterrent to polluters. This deterrent factor is
important in light of the limited availability of injunctive relief
in pollution cases; since equity requires a showing of imminent
irreparable injury, courts are reluctant to enjoin potentially
1 44
polluting activities before any actual damage has occurred.
a.

Property Damage

Property damages caused by a spill have always been recoverable at common law. Private owners of littoral and riparian
property have recovered for injuries to beaches, piers, and
142. Negligent oil pollution of navigable waters can constitute a
maritime tort. See California, Dep't of Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Traditionally, admiralty jurisdiction has attached if the injury takes place on navigable waters, but in
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), the Supreme Court added a second test to the locality standard. In Executive
Jet the Court denied admiralty jurisdiction in a case involving a jet that
crashed into Lake Erie after striking a flock of seagulls. The reason
given was that the wrong occurring on navigable waters must also bear
a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity before admiralty jurisdiction attaches. Over-the-water spill liability is not affected
by Executive Jet; liability for ship-to-shore and onshore spills from
navigation-related facilities should be similarly unaffected. See Note,
Private Actions for Damages Resulting from Offshore Oil Pollution, 2
CoLU M. J. ENVm. L. 140, 143-46 (1975). See generally Bridwell & Whihen, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the Doctrine of Executive
Jet, 1974 DuKE L.J. 757. Damages actions, of course, are subject to the
Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1970), discussed at text
accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
143. See notes 151-53 infra and accompanying text.
144. For a good collection and analysis of the cases on this point, see
Comment, Projected Environmental Harm: Judicial Acceptance of a
Concept of UncertainRisk, 53 J. URBAN L. 497 (1976). For a good discussion of this doctrine in the environmental context, see Note Imminent
IrreparableInjury: A Need For Reform, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 1025 (1972).
Courts prefer to base relaxation of the traditional standards of proof on
some statutory authority. See Opal Lake Ass'n v. Michaywe Limited
Partnership, 47 Mich. App. 354, 209 N.W.2d 478 (1973), which adopted a
"tipping point" analysis to enjoin a proposed lakeshore resort complex.
More significantly, in the final opinion on the merits of the Reserve

1976]

OIL POLLUTION

marinas; 145 a state may recover damages for injuries to lands,
14 6
such as state parks, which it holds in a proprietary capacity.
Polluters often defend against these damage actions, however, on
the ground that the polluting activity constitutes a public rather
than a private nuisance, and thus a private party cannot recover
for injuries suffered by the public generally. 14 7 Plaintiffs who
suffer special damages, however, may avoid this defense and
riparian and littoral property owners have often been given
standing to sue for property damage.' 48 New legislation might
expand plaintiffs' legally protected interests by liberalizing the
standing requirements and minimizing the distinction between
special and general damages. 149
b. Economic Losses
Common law has traditionally denied recovery for negligently caused economic losses, such as lost profits.' 50 Fishermen
have occasionally been permitted to recover for such losses,' 5'
Mining litigation the Eighth Circuit construed the use of the term "endangering" in section 1160 (g) (1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975), to

require "a lesser risk of harm than the phrase 'imminent and substantial
endangerment to persons."' Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975). The court's construction is less a true reconstruction of legislative intent than it is a judicial
adoption of a risk-benefit analysis. See Note, Reserve Mining-The
Standard of Proof Required to Enjoin an Environmental Hazard to Public Health, 59 MiNN. L. REV. 892 (1975). The Reserve Mining decision is
the first time a court has adopted a risk-benefit analysis in a suit not
involving review of administrative agency action. See, e.g., Amoco Oil
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
145. See cases cited in Wood, Requiring Polluters to Pay For Aquatic
Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollution, 8 NAT. REs. LAW. 545, 574
(1975).
146. Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973).
147. In Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973), the
court denied recovery for the loss of use of pleasure craft as a result
of the Santa Barbara oil spill on the theory that since the spill interfered
only with the public right of navigation, no special damage had been
shown.
148. See Wood, supra note 145, at 583-87. Special damages are those
that can be "distinguished from [those] sustained by other members of
the public." W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 586
(4th ed. 1971); see note 152 infra.
149. Although proposed federal liability fund legislation is not clear,
the distinction between special and general damages seems to be incorporated into proposed definitions of recoverable damages. See Wood, supra
note 145, at 576-78.
150. See Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy:
The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1964).
151. See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me.
1973).
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but courts have, nonetheless, generally denied recovery for negligent interference with a prospective advantage such as a future
catch. An important precedent for recovery of future profits
was set by the Ninth Circuit in a case arising out of the Santa
52
Barbara offshore drilling oil spill. In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen'
the court held that fishermen could recover, for anticipated
profits lost When fish were destroyed by the spill. Oppen
is based on the principle that those engaged in offshore drilling have a duty to commercial fishermen to conduct their
operations in a reasonably prudent manner so as to avoid negligent destruction of aquatic life. According to this reasoning,
losses caused to commercial fishermen were a foreseeable result
of the company's negligence. The logic of the case applies equally
as well to losses suffered by commercial fishermen as the result
of a spill from a tanker or other sources. Although other courts
have reached results similar to Oppen with respect to fishermen,
they have arbitrarily refused to extend this protection to those
off the shore, such as resort owners, who lose potential profits
as a result of the spill. 1 53 These losses, unlike losses suffered
by fishermen, are said to be common to the entire community, and thus not recoverable. New state legislation could
extend the kind of protection afforded by Oppen and permit
recovery for economic losses by a wider group of injured
parties.154
c.

Recovery by the State for Injuries to Fish and Wildlife

Expanding common law theory does seem to provide an adequate basis for relief in pollution cases where the state itself sues
for damages for injuries to fish and wildlife. Even under tradi152.

501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed in 88 H-xv. L. Rav. 444,
Oil Co. v. Oppen: Recovery of a Purely

446-47 (1974); Comment, Union

Besides
Economic Loss in Negligence, 60 IowA L. REV. 315 (1974).
recognizing a right to recover for the negligent interference with prospective advantage, Oppen is significant because it permitted recovery
by commercial fishermen using waters held in trust by the state. Such
plaintiffs may often face the argument that they lack standing to sue.
If the right to fish is a public right enjoyable by all citizens, commercial
fishermen lack an individual property right. Therefore, to obtain relief
for an invasion of a public right, fishermen must prove special damages-damages different in kind, not simply in degree, from that sustained by the public generally. Recent cases have rationalized recovery
on the ground that commercial fishermen have the requisite special
interests because they suffer a distinct pecuniary loss. For a collection
of authorities, see Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me.
1973).
153. For a well reasoned critique of the denial of recovery to such
plaintiffs, see Wood, supra note 145, at 578-80 and cases cited therein.
154. Pending federal legislation would allow recovery for economic
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tional doctrine the state could clearly recover as a property
owner for damages to interests held in its proprietary capacity.
Traditional doctrine also held, however, that since the state
lacked possessory title to fish and wildlife, it did not own them in
a proprietary capacity; rather, as sovereign, it held them in trust
for the public. 15 5 In at least two states, this lack of possessory
title has been a basis for denying the state recovery for a fish
kill. 15 6 This reasoning derives from an era when encouragement
of private ownership was thought to be the only proper public
resource policy and there was fear that the state would claim
resources at the expense of private citizens if state proprietary
claims were recognized. 57 The evolving modern view is that
state proprietary interests in common property resources are
valuable as a way to recognize a public right of use, 58 and this
theory provides the littoral states a basis upon which to seek
damage recoveries.
Lake Superior's fish and wildlife clearly are a common
property resource to be protected in the public interest. Private
parties may acquire possessory rights in these resources, but
this does not preclude the recognition of a state proprietary interest in the same resources. Moreover, as private citizens are often
denied standing to sue for injuries to such resources, the state
is the appropriate body to protect the public interest through
damage actions. Thus, the state should be allowed to sue as
parens patriae to recover damages when all state citizens are
injured by a spill causing harm to waters and marine life. The
action would be based on either the state's sovereign or proprietary interests in the natural resources. 160
losses. National Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1975,
S. 1754, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2-3, 121 CONG. REC. 8278, 8279 (1975).
For an argument that the scope of liability for economic losses should
only be expanded at the legislative level, see Henderson, Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467,
520-21 (1976).

155. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
156. State v. Dickenson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1972); Commonwealth v. Agway, 210 Pa. Super. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967). See also
State v. New Jersey Central Power &Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337
(1976) (operator of power generating plant licensed by Atomic Energy
Commission not liable because of federal preemption).
157. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539-42 (1896) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
158. See J. SAx, WATER LAw, PLANNIG &PoLicy 291-98 (1965).
159. See Wood, supra note 145, at 585-87.
160. See Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972). It is often alleged that
the Supreme Court has rejected the state ownership theory, and thus
there is no basis for recovery of damages by the state. The alleged rejec-
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This expanded notion of the state's standing to sue as parens
patriae was recently adopted in Maine v. MIV Tamano,161 in
which the state of Maine sued a vessel, its owners, and others
for damages to water and marine life caused by an accidental
discharge of 100,000 gallons of oil into Casco Bay. The court noted
that the state's right to sue was not limited to those cases in which
it sought to protect its proprietary interests, but that it could also
sue to protect its "quasi-sovereign" interests. The court also indicated a willingness, not previously displayed by the courts, to
allow a damage action. The two most substantial arguments in
favor of denying state parens patriae suits have been that such
actions expose the discharger to a risk of double liability and that
the state's interest is too speculative to be reduced to damages. In
M/V Tamano, the court characterized both these arguments as
tion came in a 1948 decision, part of a long line of cases holding that
a state can not discriminate against nonresidents in allowing access to
its natural resources. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the
Court found that a series of South Carolina statutes designed to give instate shrimp fishermen and handlers advantages over out-of-state fishermen constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. On this point
Toomer was correct, for the Court was unable to find a valid conservation purpose, the basis of a legitimate state interest, behind the South
Carolina legislation. Rejection of the ownership theory was not necessary to the decision, but the state had defended its preference scheme,
in part, on the theory that it owned the shrimp. Chief Justice Vinson,
in rejecting this argument, wrote: "The whole ownership theory, in fact,
is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand
of the importance to the people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource." Id. at 402. If "preserve and regulate" implies the power to recover damages for lost resources, then Chief Justice Vinson's statement is unobjectionable. If,
however, the statement means that a state's power is confined to conservation measures limiting private exploitation, it is wrong. Most recent cases have construed the majority opinion in Toomer in conformity
with the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, who wrote: "A state
may care for its own in utilizing the bounties of nature within its borders
because it has technical ownership of bounties or, when ownership is in
no one, because the State may for the common good exercise all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers." Id. at 408. See
Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D.Me. 1973). In Amerada
Hess the court rested state recovery of damages on the theory that since
the state was a trustee it could sue to protect the corpus of the trust.
Analogies to the private law of trusts are imperfect, and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence contains a simpler and more satisfactory rationale.
The state should be able to recover damages for losses to fish and wildlife not yet captured by private parties since there is no one else with
standing to sue. For a discussion of the constitutional problem of state
regulation of natural resources, see Power, More About Oysters Than
You Wanted To Know, 30 MD.L. REV.199, 216-23 (1970).
161. 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D.Me. 1973). See generally Note, State Protection of the Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits For
Damages, 6 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411 (1970).
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"problems of proof" and neatly suggested that the double recovery problem could be solved by excluding from the state's
162
recovery any monetary damages recovered by private citizens.
3.

ConstitutionalLimitations on State Legislation

Enactment of legislation similar to the statutes adopted by
some of the coastal states' 63 may raise a host of constitutional
questions. The most important constitutional issue that arises is
whether federal law has preempted the state's power to enact
such provisions; the FWPCA authorizes states to enact and
enforce legislation respecting discharge of pollutants'" but does
not otherwise define the reach of state power. In addition to
preemption issues, equal protection and due process claims may
arise. The spill-recovery laws of both Florida and Maine have
been challenged on a number of constitutional grounds' 65 and the
resulting case law both delineates the permissible scope of state
power and illustrates some of the constitutional difficulties such
legislation may pose. Finally, it should be noted that future
federal legislation may, by express preemption, moot the issue of
what type of state post-discharge cost-recovery legislation may
be enacted.
a. Florida: Askew v. American Waterways Operators
In 1970 Florida passed the Pollution Spill Prevention Act 66
which may serve as a model for other states considering legislation to supplement the FWPCA. The Florida Act covers
both oil and other hazardous substances. The provisions of
most interest as a guide for similar legislation include: (1) terminal facilities are required to be licensed to insure their ability
to transfer oil and other substances in a manner designed to
prevent accidental discharges; 67 (2) money from such sources
as damages recovered for cleanup is placed in the Florida Coastal
Protection Trust Fund, and more importantly, the fund will be
fed by a tax of two cents per barrel on the transfer of oil until the
357 F. Supp. at 1101-02.
See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. V 1975).
See notes 166-207 infra and accompanying text.
166. 1970 FLA. LAws ch. 70-244, as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
376.011-.21 (Supp. 1976).
167. FLA. STAT. AN-N. § 376.06 (Supp. 1976). For similar legislation,
see CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 25-54cc (1975); MD. ANN. CODE, NAT. REs.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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balance o the fund exceeds $35,000,000;16s and (3) absolute
liability is imposed for damages not recoverable under the
FWPCA.169
Section 12 of the 1973 version of the statute survived a constitutional challenge in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc.' 70 The contested statute provided:
Because it is the intent of this chapter to provide the means
for rapid and effective cleanup and to minimize damages, any
licensee and its agents or servants, including vessels destined
for or leaving a licensee's terminal -facility, who permits or
suffers a prohibited discharge or other polluting condition to
take place within state boundaries shall be liable to the state
for all costs of cleanup or other damage incurred by the state
and for damages resulting from injury to others. In any suit
to enforce claims of the state under this chapter, it shall not be
necessary for the state to plead or prove negligence in any form
or manner on the part of the licensee or any vessel. If the state
is damaged by a discharge prohibited by this chapter it need
only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or
other polluting condition and that it occurred. In addition to
the civil penalty, the pilot and the master of any vessel or person
in charge of any licensee's terminal facility who fails to give
immediate notification of a discharge to the port manager and
the nearest coast guard station shall be guilty of a felony of the
third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or
§ 775.084. The department shall, by rules and regulations, require that the licensee designate a person at the terminal
facility who shall be the person in charge of that facility for
the purposes specified by this section.' 7 '

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional, arguing that the comprehensiveness of federal legislation
and admiralty jurisdiction precluded state court adjudication of
oil and hazardous spill damage actions. Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous Court, upheld the constitutionality of the Florida

§ 8-1411 (Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN.

LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 50 (1973); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.100-.101 (Supp. 1975).
168. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11 (Supp. 1976). The section has provisions for eliminating the two cents per barrel levy if the fund equals
or exceeds $35,000,000; to reinstate it if the fund falls below $30,000,000;
and to raise the tax to ten cents per barrel to replenish the fund
if it is depleted by a disaster of "catastrophic proportions." In many
other states funds are fed only by the clean-up costs and penalties recovered by the state, see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, NAT. RES. § 8-1411(f) (Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (Supp. 1975); WASH. ANN. REV. CODE
§ 90.48.390 (Supp. 1975).
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12 (Supp. 1976).
170. 411 U.S. 325 (1972). For a useful discussion of the case, see G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 64, at 830-34. For a discussion of the
district court's decision, see Swan, Challenges to Federalism: State Law
Concerning Marine Oil Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 437 (1972).
171. 1971 FLA. LAws ch. 71-136, § 326, as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.12 (Supp. 1976).
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statute, but carefully limited the holding to one of general
constitutionality, leaving many important issues unanswered.
The comprehensiveness argument was rejected because section 12
of the Florida statute allowed the state to recover two classes
of damages not recoverable under section 311's limitation of
liability provisions: 172 the state's clean-up costs and damage to
property and the ecology of the state's waters. 173 Thus, the
Court concluded that the two Acts were harmonious, at least in
their broad outline. A second and more specific preemption argument was that section 12 was inconsistent with the Federal
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851174 and section 311's limitation

of liability provisions. Justice Douglas observed that the Court
need not reach the question of whether Florida could recover costs
in excess of those specified in the federal Act, and held "that
there is room for state action in cleaning up the waters of a State
and for recouping, at least within federal limits, so far as vessels
are concerned, her costs."'1 75 This analysis does suggest, however,

that state legislation which exceeds the federal liability limits
may be preempted. The third preemption argument was that
even if there were no specific conflict with a federal statute, the
policies behind the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction
required exclusive federal adjudication of the issues. The defendants cited several old precedents for the sweeping proposition that
because matters of interstate and international concern were at
stake, maritime law must be uniform. 1 76 These precedents had
been gradually cut back, however, and a standard similar to that
employed in nonadmiralty preemption cases had evolved: state
legislation is constitutional provided it does not specifically
contravene any acts of Congress or interfere with maritime policy.
In short, as Justice Douglas put it, "[e] ven though Congress has
acted in the admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent
clear conflict with the federal law."'1 77 The Court held that
state power to control sea-to-shore pollution was therefore not

172. 33 U.S.C. 1321(b) (iii) (Supp. V 1975).
173. The current statute does not provide for recovery for damage
to the state's ecology. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12 (Supp. 1976).
174. 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1970).
175.

411 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).

176. Id. at 337-40. For a discussion of the decline of the uniformity
doctrine prior to Askew, see Scherr, Admiralty's Power Re Pollution:
The Ability of the State to Set More Stringent Penalties Than Those of
the FederalGovernment, 7 NAT. RES. LAW. 635, 639-42 (1975).
177. 411 U.S. at 341.
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divested by admiralty jurisdiction. 178 Askew follows an earlier
case' 7 9 which suggested that since the primary purpose of
maritime policy was to promote navigational safety, state statutes with a different purpose, such as environmental protection, would not be held unconstitutional unless they frustrated
the federal policy. Askew is, then, a firm precedent for state control of oil and hazardous substance spills and state regulation of
ports and vessels in the interest of spill prevention, at least within
,the limitations of federal law.180
178. Liability for damages to persons or property on shore caused
by a vessel on navigable waters is within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). See
Comment, Federal Maritime Jurisdiction and State Marine Pollution
Legislation: The FloridaAct Not Preempted Per Se, 28 U. MAv'I L. REV.

209, 214-15 (1973), for a discussion of the Court's construction of the Act.
179. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In
Huron, soot discharges from an old fashioned boiler violated a city
smoke control ordinance. A shipowner challenged the ordinance on the
grounds that compliance constituted a burden on interstate commerce
and that a federal law, the Steamboat Inspection Act, 46 U.S.C. § 361
et seq. (1970), which provided for boiler inspections by the Coast Guard,
preempted any local, air pollution control ordinances. The preemption
-argument was rejected on the ground that the two acts had different
purposes; the federal act was concerned only with shipboard safety,
and thus supplemental municipal environmental legislation did not conflict with any federal policy. The Court pointed out that the local legislation was in fact consistent with the objectives of federal air pollution
abatement legislation. See also Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
180. Preventive regulations such as vessel construction and operation
procedures, however, may well be preempted. State authority to mandate specialized shipboard equipment and pilotage rules would seem to
be circumscribed by Burbank v. Lockhead Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624
(1973), which held that the federal government had preempted local
airport noise control, and on that basis invalidated the Burbank airport's
prohibition of nightime jet takeoffs. Because ports often serve interstate rather than purely local needs, Burbank is a strong precedent for
federal preemption of state attempts to prescribe preventive equipment
or manning requirements which differ from those permitted by the Coast
Guard. State fiscal responsibility requirements would also appear to be
preempted, see Swan, American Waterways: Florida Oil Pollution Legislation Makes It Over First Hurdle, 5 J. MARIrTImE L. & CoM. 77, 109

(1973), but the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld them in Askew without citation of authority or analysis. Since the Torrey Canyon disaster,
international conventions have attempted to prevent spills by requiring
signatory states to promulgate design and operation regulations. In the
United States these are promulgated at the federal level. With respect
to port approach routes, standards of maneuverability, and structure
design and operation, a leading commentator has concluded, "considerations of the reciprocal burdens on United States-flagships using foreign
waters, the relationships to existing treaty obligations, the impact on foreign trade ... and the general tenets of international law suggest that
preventative regulation would be most properly handled at the federal
leveL" Swan, supra, at 91.
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Although Askew left the precise boundaries of state power
undefined, it is clear that courts may not simply presume that
regulation of maritime-related activities requires a uniform federal scheme; rather, a more searching inquiry similar to that
demanded by the commerce clause preemption cases must be
made. In a commerce clause case a court must find that the
specific state regulation at issue unreasonably burdens interstate
commerce; 8 1 analogously, in an admiralty preemption case, a
court must find that the particular state regulation undermines
federal maritime policy. Askew appears to place state regulation
of terminal and transfer facilities, as well as state regulation of
port-discharge clean-up costs, on a firm basis, at least until a clear
1 82
federal port location and operation policy emerges.
Many of the hard preemption issues raised by Askew were
eliminated in 1974 when the Florida legislature amended section
12 to bring it in line with the FWPCA. Tanker owners are
now liable only for clean-up costs up to $14,000,000 and shore
facility operators are liable up to $8,000,000.183

The post-spill

recovery damages for which the state may recover, however, are
still broader than those recoverable under the federal act. 8 4 "In
addition to the foregoing costs of cleanup, terminal facilities shall
be liable to the fund for all damages in accordance with the terms
of subsections (2), (3) and (4) and § 376.11(6). '"u s These subsections allow recovery of damage claims by any person. Disagreements must be submitted to a three person arbitration
board' 8 6 and the only defenses available to a defendant are
181. See text accompanying notes 222-30 infra.

182. See MARrME TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, COMMISSION ON
SocIoTcHmIcAL SYsTEMs, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENcEs, PoRT DEVELoPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(1) (Supp.

1976).

184. Swan, supra note 180, at 99-103, discusses possible federal objections to state post-discharge recovery legislation.
185. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(1) (Supp. 1976).
186. Id. § 376.14. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035
(1973), upheld Maine's arbitration procedure, which was challenged on
the ground that a facility operator was subjected to damages without

the benefit of judicial process. Because the panel only determines the
damages payable to third parties from the fund, and damages recoverable by the state against facility operators and vessels are determined
in a judicial proceeding, no violation of due process was found. 307 A.2d
at 14-16. Because the arbitration procedure only determines claims between the fund and third parties, the terminal facility operator's right
to a jury trial is not violated. Serious constitutional questions would
arise if the arbitration procedure sought to bind terminal facility operators. 307 A.2d at 27-29.
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those allowed under the federal act.' A damage claimant need
not resort to the fund, but may bring a court action in which
the discharger will be held to a standard of strict liability, subject
to the enumerated defenses applicable in actions against the
fund.187 The original version of the Florida act required evidence of financial responsibility. Although the Supreme Court
in Askew said, without- analysis or citation to authority, that a
state requirement of financial responsibility was not preempted,
Florida amended its statute in 1974 to prevent a possible conflict.
A vessel owner and owner or operator of a terminal facility is
now required only to show evidence of fiscal responsibility
188
required by federal'laws and administrative regulations.
b. Maine: Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission
In 1969 Maine passed legislation which established a damage
fund fed by a one-half cent tax per barrel of oil transported. In
addition, they set up an arbitration procedure to process claims
against the fund. 8 9 The most striking feature of the Maine legislation is that terminal facility operators rather than tanker owners are subject to strict liability for their acts and for the acts of
vessels using their facilities. 90 In 1975, Maine added a curious
amendment which requires all vessels that will be at anchor for
more than seven days to obtain a license. License conditions can
be set by regulation and include such matters as crew training
and emergency contingency plans.' 9 ' Because tankers generally
unload within a 24-hour period, however, this statute is unlikely
to be applied. Maine also licenses terminal facility operators,
while a separate statuie provides a procedure for preconstruction review of port sites.'192
In Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental Improvement
Commission,'9" the Supreme Court of Mdine was faced with a
laundry list of constitutional challenges to the legislation. The
plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, violations of the due process clause,
the equal protection' clause, the import-export clause, the commerce clause, and the admiralty clause. The court, in a lengthy
opinion, upheld the law against each challenge.
187. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.205 (Supp. 1976).
188. Id. § 376.14.189. ME. 'REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 551 (Supp. 1976).
190.
191.

Id. § 552 (Supp. 1973).
Id. § 560 (Supp. 1976).

192. Id. §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973).
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The substance of the major due process claim 94 was that
the imposition of vicarious liability on terminal operators, where
there was no control relationship between the operators and the
vessels at fault, was an impermissible denial of due process.
The court held, however, that there was no constitutional barrier
to the imposition of vicarious liability where it serves a valid purpose'4 5 and noted that there was, as the Act states, an "adequate
opportunity to locate, among the business associates, the pri96
mary liability."'
The plaintiffs had also alleged that the imposition of strict
liability on major terminal facilities, but not on vessels using
them, not on those passing through Maine waters, and not on
small shore facilities, was a denial of equal protection. The court
found no violation of equal protection in these distinctions. It
reasoned that the legislature could rationally conclude that
terminal facilities posed a greater risk than other oil storage
facilities and that vessels not engaged in transferring oil posed
less serious risks than those engaged in vessel-to-vessel transfers
or vessel-to-shore transfers. The court's analysis of the distinction between terminal facilities and vessels entering and leaving
port was less apt, however. The terminal facilities and the vessels using them seem to pose equal risks to the public. But the
court reasoned, rather imaginatively, that the vicarious liability
provisions made the possibility of a suit against a tanker which
spilled leaving or entering a terminal remote, and that the
terminal operators could, in effect, impose liability on the
vessels themselves through "hold-harmless" provisions. 97 Thus,
the court concluded that the statute was not discriminatory, at
least on its face.
The plaintiffs' claim that the legislation violated the importexport clause of the Constitution,' 9 8 which prohibits state
imposition of import and export taxes, was directed toward the
193. 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
194. The plaintiffs also alleged that the statute violated procedural
due process, see note 186 supra, and deprived them of their property,
through the state's taxing power, in violation of the due process clause.
307 A.2d at 20-22.
195. The reasonable objective approved by the court was the legislature's conclusion that the most appropriate means of keeping the fund
from being depleted was to allow an action for reimbursement against
a terminal operator. Id. at 22-23.
196. Id. at 19.
197. Id. at 24.
198. U.S. CON&T. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:63

portion of the statute imposing a license fee on the over-water
transfer of oil destined for Canada. The Maine court interpreted
the Supreme Court precedents on what constitutes an export duty
to stand for the proposition that if the fees are imposed on activities relating to the goods, rather than on the goods themselves,
there is no tax on exports and imports. 199 The Maine scheme
could have been upheld on the basis of this rather wooden distinction 20 0 but the Maine supreme court also analyzed the problem from another more sophisticated perspective: is the tax
burden on imports or exports? There was no question that the
tax was on imports-exports, but the court found that the license
fee benefited both the state and the fuel industry and therefore
there was no burden on the import or export of oil:
The imposition of these costs is essential to provide services
which are in the best interests of plaintiffs. The prompt containment of oil spills will prevent or lessen damages caused by
the spill. Such rapid reaction benefits plaintiffs inasmuch as it
prevents or decreases their liability. The prompt containment
of spills will also prevent disruption of shipping from uncontrolled spills. The Act provides for prompt settlement of damage
claims and thereby facilitates amicable relationships between
oil carriers and other users of the sea or shoreline. It is also
significant that this minimal intrusion into the operation of the
licensees has been enacted in lieu of much harsher civil or criminal penalties which might be enacted to control the peril of
massive oil spills. These real benefits inherent in the Act totally
negative the argument that the license fee is a burden upon
imports or exports.2 0

The plaintiffs also invoked the commerce clause to challenge
not only the tax discussed above, but the entire regulatory scheme
imposed by the legislation. With regard to the tax, the court
found that it was not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce because it was non-discriminatory, reflected a fair approximation of the conduct which gave rise to the danger, and was not
202
excessive compared to the risk of environmental damage.
Nor did the regulatory scheme taken as a whole violate the
commerce clause, because Congress had not expressly preempted the field, and there was no inherent need for national
uniformity in order to prevent inconsistent local regulations.
199. See, e.g., Canton R.R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951).
200. The argument would also apply to the Florida statute. See note

168 supra and accompanying text.
201. 307 A.2d at 35-36.

202. The tax thus met the standard the-Supreme Court enunciated

in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405
U.S. 707 (1972).
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The final issue addressed in Portland Pipeline was the
Askew-type argument that the Maine scheme was inconsistent
with the constitutional grant of federal admiralty jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs argued, first, that the arbitration procedure attempted to create a new state remedy, invalid because the Judiciary Act of 1789 allows states to enforce only maritime remedies
known at common law. The court, however, reasoned that the
arbitration panel would award lump sum damages, a typical
common law remedy, and thus Maine courts could concurrently
exercise jurisdiction with federal district courts sitting in admiralty. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the vicarious liability
rule was an invalid attempt to create "novel" rules of substantive
admiralty law or rules conflicting with existing admiralty law,
and thus the need for uniform federal rules was frustrated. The
court, relying on the Askew holding that a statute violates the
admiralty clause only if it contravenes a specific act of Congress,
prejudices the characteristic features of maritime law, or interferes with its proper harmony and uniformity with respect to
interstate and international relations, declared that plaintiffs
"cited no nationalinterest which would be affected by the imposition upon oil terminals of vicarious liability." 20 3 The court concluded that the state statute was not inconsistent with the admiralty clause. In finding that the Act did not conflict with a
specific federal statute, the Maine supreme court read Askew for
the proposition that under section 311 of the FWPCA, a state may
not only impose liability where not imposed by federal law, but
may also impose unlimited liability for discharges that injure its
interests. Whether this reading of Askew is correct remains
doubtful,20 4 although it is of some significance that the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal of the Portland case for want of a
substantial federal question.20 5 Askew also left unanswered
the question of whether the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851,
which has been held to apply to shore damages, 20 6 applies to
state post-discharge recovery legislation governing vessels. The
terminal operators in Portland argued that because the Maine
Act did not limit the liability of vessels, it was invalid. The state
wisely conceded that any action against vessels would be governed by the federal statute, however, and the court construed
the statute to avoid constitutional infirmities: there was no con203.
204.
205.
206.
1958).

307 A.2d at 44.
See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra.
414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y.
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flict because the Act "by its terms, does not provide for unlimited
liability .... ",207

4.

Express FederalPreemption

State post-discharge cost recovery legislation may be expressly preempted in the future if Congress ratifies the IMCO
Fund Convention and passes supplementing "superfund" legislation.208 The Senate has not yet ratified the convention, but the
Ford Administration and Senator Magnuson have introduced
legislation to create a domestic fund to supplement the IMCO
Convention. Both bills impose strict liability (subject to slightly
different exceptions) on vessels and shore facilities. The Administration bill,209 limits liability to $150 per ton or $20,000,000
210
for vessels and $50,000,000 for on- and offshore facilities;

Senator Magnuson's bill, 211 contains the same limitations except

that it increases the liability limitation to $100,000,000 for deep
water ports. 212

These liability limits are in addition to the

limits of the IMCO Civil Liability Convention and would
apply to ships in United States territorial waters. To supplement the liability limitations, both bills create a fund fed
by a per-barrel tax on oil transferred from ship to shore. The
major differences between the two bills are: (1) under the
Administration bill, state laws are preempted, 21 3 while state

liability schemes are not preempted under the Magnuson
bill; 214 and (2) under the Administration bill, the injured party
must first sue the party responsible for the spill before applying
to the fund for compensation. 215 The Magnuson bill allows
the injured party to approach the fund directly; to avoid double
recoveries, claimants are precluded from receiving compensation
for the same damages from both sources. 21 0
207.

208.

307 A.2d at 45.

For discussions of pending legislation, see Wood, Requiring Pol-

luters to Pay for Aquatic Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollution, 8 NAT.
RES. LAW. 545, 567-68 (1975); Wood, An Integrated International and

Domestic Approach to Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Pollution, 7 J.
MATnxRm L. & Com. 1 (1975). See also Goldie, Liability For Oil Pollution Disasters: InternationalLaw and the Delimitation of Competence in
a FederalPolicy, 6 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 303 (1975).
209.
210.
211.
212.

S. 2162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Id. § 105(a).
S. 1754, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Id. § 3 (b).

216.

S. 1754, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (b) (1975).

213. S. 2162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 114 (1975).
214. S. 1754, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (a) (1975).
215. S. 2162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110(b) (1975).
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STATE POWER TO DENY PORT AcCESS TO VESSELS

Kantian notions of moral imperatives are popular among
environmentalists, 217 and in the name of such imperatives states
may now be subjected to political pressure to avoid the risks of
oil and hazardous substances pollution by barring ships carrying
those cargoes from Lake Superior. Article I of the Boundary
Water Treaty between Canada and the United States 218 guarantees to ships of the two countries the right to use Lake Superior
for navigation. 19 If navigation is construed not to include access
to a United States port, however, a state might have the option to
deny port access to all vessels carrying oil and hazardous substances. 220 While the issue may be largely hypothetical, since
the need for economic development in the Upper Midwest makes
it unlikely that any of the lake states would take such a drastic
step, it is nonetheless relevant to the general question of spill
prevention strategy.
Clearly the most effective way to prevent oil and other
hazardous substances spills is for the states which own the bed
of the lake to prohibit tankers from using it. A state's power
to conserve its resources is, however, circumscribed by the power
217. See Olpin, Policing Toxic Chemicals, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 85, 94.
218. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, 36 Stat. 2448 (1909), T.S. No. 548
(effective May 13, 1908).
219. Article I of the treaty provides:
The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of
all navigable boundary waters shall forever continue free and
open for the purpose of commerce to the inhabitants and to the
ships, vessels, and boats of both countries equally, subject, however, to any laws and regulations of either country, within its
own territory, not inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation and applying equally and without discrimination to the
inhabitants, ships, vessels, and boats of both countries.
220. The legislative history of the Boundary Waters Treaty provides
little insight into the question of whether freedom of navigation includes
the right of port access; the treaty drafters were primarily concerned
with the problem of water diversion and lake level regulation. See gen-

erally L. BLOOMIEMD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF

CANADA AND THE UNnIED STATES (1958); Griffin, A History of the Cana-

dian-United States Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 37 U. DET. L.J. 76
(1959). Based on the purpose of the treaty and the language of article
I, the most persuasive argument is that the treaty does not include a
right of access to Canadian or United States ports. Most probably the
treaty incorporates the customary international law concept of freedom

of navigation, which is limited to the right of innocent passage through
a nation's territorial waters. See note 10 supra. Boundary waters are
defined as waters from main shore to main shore of the lake; this
definition reinforces the argument that the right of navigation does not
include port access.
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of the federal government to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce in the interest of free trade.221 Both the states and
the federal government have important interests at stake in the
area of resource conservation; in order that those interests be
accommodated, states cannot have complete discretion to control
access and use in the name of environmental quality.
In order to determine the proper scope of state authority
to deny access to its ports, it is first necessary to distinguish
between federal preemption of state regulation and the invalidity
of state statutes under the "dormant" powers of the commerce
clause. 222 Clearly, Congress may pass a law or ratify a treaty
expressly authorizing tanker use of a lake.223 It is also possible
for the Court to conclude that the right to use the lake is
implied in the federal scheme of navigation regulation. State
regulation would be barred by federal preemption in both cases.
Once the Court decides that the state law is inconsistent with
a federal law or statutory policy enacted pursuant to a granted
224
power, the supremacy clause dictates that state law must yield.
A recent decision by a Washington three judge federal court
illustrates this principle. A Washington statute prohibited tankers of over 125,000 dwt from entering Puget Sound and prohibited
tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 dwt from entering unless they
were built with double bottoms, twin screws, and radar.22 5 Although limited exceptions were allowed, 226 the prohibitions

effectively precluded any supertanker from entering the Sound.
On September 24, 1976 a three judge panel held that the statute
was preempted by the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act
221.

See U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8.

222. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Professor Gunther has written that for this limitation "the Court has not
drawn an [sic] any overt restraint on state power, but rather on the
grant of power to Congress in Art. I, § 8, to regulate interstate commerce.
Into that affirmative grant of power the court has read self-executing
limits on state legislation when Congress has not acted." G. GuNTHEm,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

279 (9th ed. 1975).

The most cogent rationale for

the assertion of this power is presented in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion
in H.P. Hood & Sons v. DulViond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35, 537-39 (1949).
223. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-

16 (1936). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 222, at 357.
224. See Florida Lime &Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
141 (1963).
225. 1975 WASH. LAws ch. 125, § 3(2)(lst Extraordinary Sess., May
29, 1975).
226. Tankers inballast or escorted by tugs with an aggregate horse
power to five percent of the dwt of the tanker are allowed to enter the
Sound. Id.
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of 1972227 under which the Coast Guard had already promulgated tanker design regulations that did not require double
bottoms.

22 8

The Court's power to invalidate state legislation under the
commerce clause goes beyond preemption. States may validly
regulate commerce, since federal power in that area is not exclusive.229 State laws may nevertheless be invalid even where
there is no federal law or statutory policy directly applicable, if
the law burdens interstate or foreign commerce. Whether a state
law burdens interstate or foreign commerce is determined by the
Court's taking evidence and balancing the state's interest against
0
the burden on commerce.

23

Beyond these well established principles, generalizations
about the allocation of regulatory authority between the states
and the federal government are hazardous. One can nonetheless
start with the observation that the Court recognizes the need to
accommodate legitimate state interests with assertions of federal
authority. In Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,231
the Supreme Court found no conflict between the commerce
clause and the state's action in damming a "small" navigable
creek for health reasons, despite the allegation that federally
licensed ships would be prevented from plying the creek. Thus
a starting point in analyzing the scope of state regulatory author227. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648M, (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 1976).
228. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
229. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 316 (1851).
230. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945).
Southern Pacific still seems to represent the Supreme Court's approach
to "dormant" commerce clause problems. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970), Justice Stewart writing for a unanimous Court
struck down an Arizona law requiring cantaloupe grown in the state to
be packed and shipped in the state in order to protect and enhance the
reputation of growers within the state. Although Justice Stewart noted
that "[o]ccasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues. . . but more frequently it has spoken
in terms of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and burdens," id. at 142, he proceeded to balance the state's interest against the impact on the plaintiff.
Both parties stipulated that the cantaloupes, which were packed across
the Colorado river in California, were of exceptionally high quality, and
Justice Stewart found that the state's legitimate interest in product reputation did not justify the construction of a $200,000 packing plant 31 miles
from plaintiff's existing plant. He also suggested that state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in a home state that could
be more efficiently performed elsewhere are "virtually per se illegal."
Id. at 145.
231. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
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ity is to identify the relevant state interests; littoral states unquestionably have a high interest in protecting the quality of
Lake Superior.
The weight accorded a state's interest in protecting the public
is illustrated by the modern standard for evaluating local health
regulations alleged to be unconstitutional. Unless "the total
effect of a law as a safety measure. . . is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it," the
statute will be upheld.23 2 The Court's standard of review, however, is in fact more penetrating than this language suggests.
Under this standard two types of legislation, closely analogous
to a prohibition on all tanker use of a lake, have been invalidated
as inconsistent with the commerce clause policy of free trade.
First, the Court has invalidated state legislation that attempts
to allocate natural resources to the use of state citizens in
preference to citizens of other states. In invalidating a statute
which required all local demand for natural gas to be met before
gas could be exported, the Court expressed the concern that:
If the States have such power a singular situation might result.
Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber,
the mining States their minerals. And why may not the products of the field be brought within the principle? Thus enlarged, or without that enlargement, its influence on interstate
commerce need not be pointed out. To what consequences does
such power tend? If one State has it, all States have it;
embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be
halted at state lines. And yet we have said that "in matters of
foreign and interstate commerce there are no state lines." In
such commerce, instead of the States, a new power appears and
a new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any State.
But rather let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the
States and that of each State is made the greater by a division
of its resources, natural and created, with every other State,
and those of every other State with it.233
232. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1944).
233. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1923),
quoting from West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia and the other cases analyzed in this
section were reaffirmed by the court during the last term. Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 96 S. Ct. 2488 (1976). To reduce the number
of abandoned automobiles within the state, Maryland paid a bounty to
any processor who destroyed an automobile eight years or older. In
1974 the law was changed to require greater title documentation from
out- as compared to in-state processors. A Virginia processor challenged
the amendments as a burden on interstate commerce. In rejecting the
commerce clause argument, Justice Powell wrote: "The common thread
of all these cases is that the State interfered with the natural functioning
of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burden-
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Second, where a state has available a less restrictive alternative, the Court may also invalidate the state legislation. This was
the standard adopted in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,2 34 where
the Court struck down a Wisconsin ordinance regulating milk
pasteurization, stating that "even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people"
the state must use whatever reasonable and adequate alternatives
23 5
are available to meet its ends.
Applying these two principles to hypothetical state attempts
to prohibit the transportation of oil and other hazardous substances on Lake Superior, I conclude that such a statute would
be unconstitutional. A state's attempt to restrict use of Lake
Superior to those activities deemed consistent with ecological
imperatives is a more serious interference with interstate and
foreign commerce than a state's attempt to give its citizens a preference in the allocation of natural resources. Someone will consume the natural resources and one could argue, as Justice
Holmes did in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,230 that it might as
well be the people close to their source. Navigable waterways, on the other hand, have historically been arteries of commerce and a means of binding states and nations together. Closing an artery to an important class of trade would undermine
the primary purpose of the commerce clause. 237
Although
national policy with regard to water use has evolved to include
uses other than enhancing navigation, free trade remains important. Recent state and federal pollution control legislation
should be construed to reflect only a national policy that traditional uses should be undertaken in a manner consonant with
the preservation of environmental quality. Consistent with this
national policy, the states may enact post-spill recovery legislation; 238 but in light of the continuing need for trade, this option
some regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the
flow of hulks, nor to regulate the conditions under which it may occur."
96 S. Ct. at 2496. Justice Powell also noted that "nothing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens . . . ." Id. at 2497. Although the case
sustains a state environmental law, Hughes thus offers no support for
the proposition that a state can close its waters to tankers.
234 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
235. Id. at 354.
236. 262 U.S. 553, 602-03 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
237. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
238. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b) (1970).
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may well be the limit of state power. In short, a less restrictive
alternative than denial of access is available.
Despite this analysis, it could be argued that a court need
not balance interests in the context of environmental protection
because the interest in the environment is so powerful that it
outweighs any conceivable burden on commerce. This argument
can be bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court's overriding
concern in the commerce clause cases has been the prevention
of state discrimination against nonresidents. 2 9 State legislation
that applies to residents and nonresidents alike poses a lesser
threat to commerce clause policies and greater weight can be
given to the interests that a state has identified as pressing. Lack
of discrimination against nonresidents was a major factor in the
decision of an Oregon intermediate appellate court upholding a
state environmental law which required all soft drinks and beer
to be sold in returnable containers. 24 0 The court did not engage in
the usual balancing of federal and state interests. The Supreme
Court, however, has always employed a balancing test where
interstate transportation is involved 241 because at issue in commerce clause cases is whether a particular problem demands a
uniform solution; where Congress fails to indicate a preference,
this function falls to the courts. Thus the Oregon decision
should probably not be read to stand for the proposition that a
court need not attempt to balance competing needs where envi239.

See Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental

Law, in FEiDERAL ENVmONMENTAL LAW 20, 94 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert
ed. 1974). "New" states' rights advocates can find support in State v.
Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alas. 1976). The Alaska supreme court upheld
an emergency state regulation declaring certain areas within and without
the territorial waters of the state closed to king crab fishermen. A "dormant" commerce clause argument was rejected on the grounds that: (1)
any argument that the regulation caused interference with United States
foreign relations policies or treaties was speculative because the regulations would not be enforced against foreign nationals, see Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); (2) national regulations were not "truly necessary" since the Department of Commerce had concluded in 1974 that
a uniform approach to fisheries regulation would be inadvisable and selfdefeating; (3) the regulations were not discriminatory against non-Alaskans as they applied equally to both intrastate and interstate fishing
boats; and (4) "there is no reason to think that exercise of this jurisdiction in a patently neutral fashion will provoke retaliatory restrictions
by Alaska's sister states." 546 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
240. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm., 15 Ore.
App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (Ct. App. 1973). The case has rightly been criticized for the court's failure to employ a balancing analysis. See Comment, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce
Clause, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1762, 1778 (1974).
241. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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ronmental matters are involved. A more sound interpretation of
the decision is that when "the effect of state regulation is merely
to force nonresident industries to internalize what would otherwise be externalities imposed by those industries on state residents" 242 the statute is not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. This reading of the Oregon decision is consistent
with the results in Askew and PortlandPipeline,but the reasoning would not support prohibitions on shipping or the denial of
port access. Implicit in all three cases is the principle that a
state's definition of desired standards of environmental quality
is consistent with the policies of the commerce clause only so long
as commerce remains open to all who can meet reasonable state
standards.
In some instances, however, a reasonable state environmental
standard could encompass a prohibition on the use of a state's
resources. Such a prohibition would be consistent with the
commerce clause only if the burden on interstate commerce were
slight. The decision in Hackensack Meadowlands Committee v.
Municipal Authority,243 a recent New Jersey case now pending
before the Supreme Court, illustrates one form of state resource
use prohibition which has only a slight impact on interstate
commerce. To prolong the life of its landfills, New Jersey banned
all out-of-state solid wastes except those used to manufacture
fuel. Applying the Supreme Court's balancing test, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that this legislation was not preempted
by any federal legislation and did not violate the dormant commerce clause power of the federal government. Quoting Justice
Holmes's language in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,2 44 the New

Jersey court found that prolonging the useful life of a landfill
site was a legitimate state interest and that the legislation's purpose was to protect "vital resources of New Jersey, not to impose
economic barriers or create commercial restrictions. 24 5 The
burdens on interstate commerce were found to be slight since the
exporting states of New York and Pennsylvania had methods
(albeit more costly than shipping their garbage to the Garden
State) of disposing of their wastes. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia24 6 was distinguished on the ground that there the state was
242. Comment, supranote 240, at 1782.
243. 348 A.2d 505, 68 N.J. 451 (1975), prob. juris. noted Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 96 S. Ct. 1504 (1976).
244. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).

245. 68 N.J. at 475; 348 A.2d at 517.
246. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). See text accompanying note 233 supra.
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trying to preserve a resource for "selfish economic and commercial gain" whereas in Hackensack Meadowlands, New Jersey
sought to protect the health of its citizens. This distinction is not
as "clear" and "basic" as the New Jersey court suggests, however,
and in fact, it appears untenable. There is no essential difference
between a state's interest in protecting its citizens from disease
and its fragile resources, such as wetlands, from being filled,
and the state's interest in insuring that its citizens have adequate fuel for industry and home use. Hackensack Meadowlands does, nonetheless, indicate that a state's interest in environmental quality should be honored if all that is required
by the legislation is that other states dispose of their own wastes.
Clearly, a state need not be a sink for surrounding states.
Despite the special regard for a state's environmental concerns
evident in the Hackensack Meadowlands decision, however, the
rationale cannot be stretched to cover littoral states' denial of use
of their waters or ports, because the requirement that the burden
247
on commerce be slight simply could not be met.

F.

USE OF STATE LAND USE LAWS TO PREVENT SPILLS BY CONTROLLING PORT LOCATION

State and local land use controls designed to limit the use
of coastal waters for commodity transportation, by controlling the
location of oil storage facilities, for example, are an alternative
spill prevention strategy open to the states. If any new controls
are implemented, they will be undertaken within the framework
of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1974 (CZMA) ,248 which
provides federal planning and operating money to coastal states
(including those bordering the Great Lakes) voluntarily adopting
a coastal zone management program. If a state declines to participate in the program, the federal government may not compel
it to do so. A state which chooses to participate cedes no direct
regulatory authority to the federal government. 249 If a state
247. Although questions similar to those posed by the Oregon and
New Jersey cases recently were raised in an action challenging the Washington statute that required, inter alia, double bottoms on supertankers
between 40,000 and 125,000 dwt entering Puget Sound, see notes 225-28
supra and accompanying text, the federal district court held only that the
state statute was preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972 and did not reach the dormant commerce clause or interference with
foreign affairs issues.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648M

(W.D. Wash. Sept. 1976).
248.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. V 1975).

249. Id. § 1456 (e) (1). The preservation of the role of local governments in coastal zone planning and regulation is a consistent theme in
the legislative history of the Act. See Mandelker & Sherry, The Coastal
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program fails to meet statutory standards, the government's only
remedy is to withhold funds. 250 This scheme of indirect federal
control is designed to leave state governments free to develop
a structure of shared local and state regulatory authority which
balances demands for growth against environmental protection.
Environmentalists have also pointed out that it was the hope of
some of the sponsors of the legislation that states would
adopt programs that would channel growth away from coastal
areas. 25 '
Despite the judicious refusal of Congress to impose a single
regulatory program on the states, the CZMA has a potentially
significant impact on the realignment of local and state regulatory
authority. Historically, local governments have had the primary
responsibility for regulating coastal development; state governments intervened only to acquire land for public purposes and to
improve navigation. The CZMA, in the words of a prominent
coastal scholar, attempts to encourage the states "to reclaim the
predominant decision-making role."2 2 When growth occurs the
Act encourages (but does not require) states to adopt policies
that distinguish between water-related and non-water-related
uses, and to prefer the former. In short, the CZMA gives financial incentive and support for a state decision to implement the
public trust over its waters and associated shoreland by opting
for environmental quality maintenance in the coastal zone.
States are now experimenting with three new land use
control techniques relevant to coastal zone development: (1)
designation of "critical areas," either because the area contains
environmentally sensitive resources, or is marked for rapid
development, or both;25 3 (2) energy and industrial facility siting
Zone Management Act of 1972, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 119, 121-127 (1974).
See also Brewer, The Concept of State and Local Relations Under the
CZMA, 16 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 717 (1975).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(b) (Supp. V 1975).
251. After a study of the legislative history Mandelker and Sherry
conclude: "The CZMA... came as a response to pressures for legislative action from those primarily concerned with coastal preservation and
enhancement." Mandelker & Sherry, supra note 249, at 136. See generally Cameron, NEPA and the CZMA: The Environmental Impact
Statement and Section 306 Guidelines, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 773
(1975).
252. Power, The Federal Role in Coastal Development, in FEDFRAL
Doglin & T. Guilbert ed. 1975).
ENVIONmENTAL LAw 792, 833 (E.
253. The most comprehensive statute allowing the designation of
critical areas is the Florida Environmental Land Water Management Act,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(2) (c)(Supp. 1974). See Finnel, Saving Paradise: The FloridaEnvironmental Land Water Management Act of 1972,
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review;25 4 and (3) state standards for review of local land use
planning in the coastal zone. 255

Each of these techniques in-

volves some shift of regulatory authority from local to state
governments, but none involves state preemption. Around Lake
25 6
Superior, Minnesota has adopted a power plant siting statute,
and Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have 'been pioneers in
implementing the critical areas approach through the passage of
inland wetlands protection legislation. 257 States such as Florida
and Vermont have adopted statutory programs to oversee shoreline development. 258 California and Washington have adopted
the most comprehensive coastal zone management programs involving a combination of regional planning and administrative
1973 URBAN L. ANN. 103. For a good review of the concept of critical
areas designation, see Mandelker, Critical Area Controls: A New
Dimension in American Land Development Regulation, 41 A.I.P. 21
(1975).
254. For a review of recent legislation, see Van Baalen, Industrial
Siting Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information

and Siting Act-Advance or Retreat?, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv. 27

(1976).
255. See, e.g., California Coastal Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. CODE
ANN., Pus. REs. § 27000 et seq. (1972); Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, REv. CODE WASH. 90.58.10 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
See CoUNCIL ON EmrmoNmExTAL QUALITY, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 49-92
(1974), for a review of recent coastal protection and related legislation.
256. MINN. STAT. §§ 166C.51-.69 (1974).
257. MICH. COP. LAWS §§ 281.631-.642 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. §
105.485 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971 (West Supp. 1976). See generally Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9 CAL. WEsTERN L.
REV. 391 (1973).
258. Florida's coastal zone management program designates preservation areas, conservation areas, and development areas. Development
in areas designated for this purpose is somewhat constrained by the policy that priority is given to water-related uses such as ports and waterrelated industry, utilities that must have waterfront location, and waterrelated commercial uses such as marinas. Further, in addition to the
water-relatedness criteria, enhancement of aesthetics is a primary consideration in location decisions concerning commercial shoreline uses.
See Coastal Zone Summary Sheets, Florida Coastal Coordinating Council
Recommendation For Development Activities in Florida's Coastal Zone,
reprinted in Deep Water Ports Act of 1973, Hearings on S. 1971 and S.
2232 before the Joint Subcomm. on Deepwater Ports Legislation of
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Public
Works, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1344 (1973).
VERMONT STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1421 et seq. (1973), as amended, §
1422 et seq. (Supp. 1976), provides for a comprehensive state water resources use plan, and for state planning and coordination of local shoreline protection bylaws. "The primary purpose of the plan shall be for
the preventive control of pollution, giving due consideration to necessary
development and growth." Id. § 1423(b) (Supp. 1976). The statute sets
planning standards that favor domestic, nonpolluting, and recreational
uses of the state's shorelines and waterways.
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review of specific development decisions, 259 and Maine and Wyo260
ming have adopted innovative industrial siting legislation.
Thus, a wide variety of techniques are open to states wishing to
control coastal development. However, any new land controls
adopted with respect to the Lake Superior shoreline should be
adopted primarily for purposes other than spill prevention. The
Duluth-Superior region is economically depressed and there are
261
no substantial pressures for intensive shoreline development.
The twelve Lake Superior ports are adequate to handle the most
optimistic projected increases in cargoes and therefore land use
controls will have only a peripheral impact on the use of the lake
for shipping.
If a state chooses to preserve the purity of its offshore waters
by adopting a coastal zone development plan which prohibits oil
refinery and storage facilities, does the CZMA contain any constraints? It has been argued that the federal government probably cannot disapprove a program that fails to provide for state
regulation of energy siting facilities because "the Act lacks
action-forcing language." 262 Further, section 307 requires federal agencies to insure that "to the maximum extent practicable"
their activities are consistent with state management programs. 26 3 This section provides a mechanism by which states
can force a federal agency to deny a grant of funds, or more importantly, to withhold a permit, such as a Corps of Engineers
dredge and fill permit. Thus, a state can probably withdraw a
coastal area from development to prevent serious environmental
degradation as well as prevent the expansion of already crowded
facilities. 26 4 Although the federal government cannot preempt
259. CAL. CODE ANN., PuB. REs. § 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976);
43.51.650 et seq. (1970).

WASH.REV. CODE ANN. §

260. See ME. RIv. STAT. tit. 38, § 481 et seq. (Supp. 1976); WYOMNG
STAT. §§ 35-502.75-.94 (Supp. 1975).

261. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 21, at 34.
262. Whitney, Siting, of Energy Facilities in the Coastal Zone: A
CriticalRegulatory Hiatus, 16 Ww. &. MARY L. REV. 805, 815 (1975).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c)(1), (2) (Supp. V 1975). For a good analysis of the potential authority this section grants to the states, see Rubin,
The Role of Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 in the Development
of Oil and Gas from Outer Continental Shelf, 8 NAT. REs. LAw. 399
(1975).

264. The Deep Water Ports Act of 1974 is not applicable to the Great
Lakes. The Act allows states to veto the location of a port off its shores,
thus indicating the deference that Congress is likely to show to state
coastal zone decisions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (Supp. V 1975). See generally Deepwater Port Act of 1972, Hearings Before the Special Joint
Subcomm. on Deepwater Ports Legislation of the Senate Comm. on
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a state land use decision which has the effect of outlawing refining and storage facilities, the Act does leave the federal government some power to prevent exclusionary coastal zone policies 26 5
through the fund disbursement provisions.
Federal funds under the Act are disbursed in two stages:
planning grants are followed by grants to implement a federally
approved management program. The criteria for approval seem
primarily intended to give the federal government some leverage
with which to induce state governments to take a more active
role in local decisionmaking on matters affecting environmental
quality. 66 Section 306(8), however, provides that before approval of a program, the Secretary of Commerce must find that
"[t] he management program provides for adequate consideration
of the national interest involved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet requirements which are other than local in nature."267 Congress was seeking by this provision to prevent
Commerce, Interiorand Insular Affairs, and Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pts. I & 11 (1973); Meltz, The Deep Water Ports Act of 1974: Half
Speed Ahead, 5 ENVm. L. REP. 50043 (Envir. L. Inst. 1975). For a case
study of a local community's successful attempt to ban a refinery from
a coastal site, see Deal, The Durham Controversy: Energy Facility Siting
and the Land Use Planning and Control Process, 8 NAT. REs. LAw. 437
(1975).
265. See Hershman, Achieving Federal-State Coordinationin Coastal
Resources Management, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1975).
266. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. V 1975) directs the Secretary of
Commerce to make certain findings before approving a state's coastal
management program, including findings that the state has coordinated
its program with local and regional plans, and that an effective mechanism for continuing cooperation and coordination with local units of government has been set up. Section 1455 (d) requires, further, that the
Secretary find that the state have the power to implement its management plan, through purchase and condemnation of interests in land and
water and the administration of land and water use regulations. The Act
thus conditions grants of federal money on local participation coupled
with state coordination and state power to put the plan into effect.
267. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) (8) (Supp. V 1975). The Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Act of July 26, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94370, 94 Stat. 370, signed by President Ford on July 26, 1976, strengthens
the powers of the states to veto federally licensed activities but also increases the leverage of the federal government. In addition to preserving a state veto of federally licensed projects, the federal government will
provide impact assistance to states whose shores are subjected to the
pressure of rapid development due to the exploitation of the outer continental shelf. Current Developments, 7 ENvm. REP. 537 (July 30, 1976).
In support of its supertanker ban in Puget Sound, the State of
Washington argued that the Commerce Department's approval of its
coastal management plan "somehow waives federal preemption in the
area." Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75-648M at 5-6 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 1976). In rejecting the argument, the court noted that the Secre-
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other states from following the lead of Delaware, which banned
heavy industry from its coastlines. 2
Section 306 (8) is an incomplete reaction to the problem,
however, for it fails to define with any precision the federal government's response to a state exclusionary policy. The most that
can be said is that a state which participates in a coastal zone
management program cannot ignore the consequences of an
exclusionary land use policy. Considerable federal jawboning to
induce a state to permit use of its waters for transportation and
reception of oil and other hazardous commodities might reasonably be expected.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to explicate the complicated legal context in which decisions about a spill strategy for
Lake Superior will be made. Because control of oil spill pollution
inevitably affects international shipping, international agreements and federal law provide basic reference points necessary
for assessment of the state role in controlling marine pollution.
While state power to impose liability and provide for damage
recovery has not been preempted completely by international and
national law, it is safe to say that state authority is most circumscribed when it impinges directly on regulation of international
shipping. Thus, the tanker design regulations adopted by the
1973 IMCO Convention and by the United States Coast Guard
will preclude any state from requiring inconsistent standards for
tankers entering waters under that state's jurisdiction. Similarly,
state attempts to deny oil tankers access to ports or, in the case of
the littoral states, use of the lake itself, would almost certainly
be invalidated as inconsistent with the commerce power and as
an interference with foreign trade. The fate of state-level damage compensation funds in light of the IMCO Fund Convention
and pending federal legislation, on the other hand, is undecided.
Based on the proposals now before Congress, such funds could
tary can only approve a state plan if "the views of Federal agencies
principally affected by such program"have been adequately considered,"
16 U.S.C. § 1456 (b) (1970), and concluded "[t]he Secretary may or may
not have noticed the preemptive effect of the PWSA on Washington's
Tanker Law. That is not before us. We cannot read the Secretary's
approval of a coastal zone management plan, to which the Tanker Law is
only collaterally related, as foreclosing our inquiry into the federal
preemption of oil tanker regulation." Atlantic Rictfied Co. v. Evans,
supra.
268. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-014 (1974).
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either join tanker design regulations in the preempted category
or continue to exist as an alternative source of recovery for spill
victims; even if the federal fund law eventually enacted allows
complementary state statutes, the volume of oil-transporting
traffic on Lake Superior is presently too small to justify creation
of such a fund.
Except for these limitations relating to international trade,
however, states may seek to effect a plan of oil pollution prevention through a variety of methods. They may, for example,
follow the lead of international bodies and the federal government and impose strict liability for harmful discharges. Because
the FWPCA is concerned primarily with cleanup, states may also
go further and provide recovery for interests such as property
damage and economic loss, which are not covered by the present
federal law. They may ensure standing for individual claimants
by eliminating the distinction between general and special
damages for plaintiffs who suffer an injury which is peculiar to
the individual but nonetheless not recognized by the common law.
Nonstatutory remedies, such as a common law action by the state
as parens patriae to recover for' harm to fish and wildlife, are
also available to fill the gaps in the federal recovery scheme.
The ability of states under the CZMA to deny use of the
shoreline for ports or storage facilities is as yet untested. Although technically the statute does not preclude a state from
incorporating such strict land use regulations as part of a
pollution control program, federal power to withhold money from
states with disapproved plans may make such a scheme economically impractical. For purposes of designing a spill control strategy for Lake Superior, many of these questions relating to state
power may be only academic. Since there is presently no pressure for shoreline development, issues under the CZMA are not
likely to arise.
Because the three littoral states of Lake Superior do not face
the same threat of catastrophic spills as coastal states such as
Florida and Maine, an adequate spill strategy for Lake Superior
may be fashioned from general water pollution 26 9 and land use
269. The FVPCA directs that all point source dischargers use the
"best available technology" by 1983, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2) (A) (Supp.
V 1975), and the states are free to supplement this effluent standard
with higher receiving water quality standards. Id. § 1311 (b) (1) (C). The
littoral states have responded enthusiastically to this invitation and now
are in the process of implementing a non-degradation policy for Lake
Superior. This is illustrated by Minnesota's, Michigan's and Wisconsin's
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programs. The states may decide that the lake should be
dedicated to the maintenance and enhancement of environmental
quality, and thus adopt a non-degradation policy pursuant to
their trusteeship of the lake's beds and waters. Consistent with
this aim, carefully considered legislation which supplements
existing damage recovery rules to provide coverage for the property damage and economic losses suffered by private and public
shoreland owners would be the most beneficial innovation.
aggressive efforts to halt Reserve Mining's discharge of taconite tailings
into the lake. See Reserve Mining Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975).

